West Africa's Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peace-Building

5 The Guinean Dimension: Dynamics of the Sub-regional Conflicts and Implications for Peace

West Africa’s Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peace-Building 49 5 The Guinean Dimension: Dynamics of the Sub-regional Conflicts and Implications for Peace Another very important dimension to the intermittent conflicts in West Africa is the dovetailing nature of these conflicts or what has been referred to as the ‘exportation of war’. The role or possible role that Guinea may have played in exacerbating the conflicts in this region is worth examining. It is indeed very interesting to note that Guinea consistently accused Liberia of sponsoring rebels and trying to destabilize its own government. Liberia in turn, accused Guinea of supporting dissidents, primarily the rebel group known as Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD) that had been trying to overthrow the Taylor government. The Liberian government then maintained that LURD who had periodically attacked Lofa County since 1999 and even approached the outskirts of Monrovia in their attacks were based in and supported by Guinea. On the other hand, Sierra Leone also did accuse Liberia of having sponsored the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) against its government during the bloody Sierra Leonean war. Guinea, which has a population of about 7.2 million people according to the 1996 census, and a landmass of 245,857 sq. kilometres or 94,926 sq. miles, is made up significantly of the Mandingo population. Alhaji Koromah, leader of ULIMO-K during the Liberian civil war is a Mandingo by birth, and thus it is to be expected that he should have strong cultural if not political ties with Guinea. In fact, President Taylor at a stage protested the alleged training of Mandingo rebels in Guinea. Suffice it to say that, on the other hand, Guinea had an overt distrust of Côte d’Ivoire, which it accused of supporting Charles Osita Agbu 50 Taylor. In retrospect, let us recall that whatever their distaste for Samuel Doe, Guinea and Sierra Leone probably for internal security reasons, maintained relatively friendly relations with Doe. These countries were then inundated with Liberian refugees during the Liberian war, many of whom were Doe’s allies. For the three countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea that make up the Mano River Union, what is immediately common about these countries is the geographical proximity of each to the other. Another common observation, which is even more pertinent, is the availability of abundant natural and mineral resources in the area. Hence, very valuable resources like timber, iron one, rubber, diamonds and gold could be found in commercial quantities. The implication is that the desire to control, exploit and export these resources meant the frequent movement and intermingling of their citizens, especially those living in and around the border areas. Again, the scheming and jostling of some of the actors, including governments, foreign agents and even mercenaries were to some extent, to be in a position to benefit directly or indirectly from the exploitation of these resources. This had meant some sort of competition, and therefore increased conflicts with the ultimate aim of being able to control and access the mineral-rich areas in these countries. Of course, this had its political costs as the events unfolded. For instance, it had been observed that the conflict in the region was exacerbated when Taylor on taking over in Liberia refused to honour his promise of allowing his Sierra Leonean allies access to more minerals in Liberia. It was fairly common knowledge that the Liberian government was involved in the Sierra Leonean war, and that this constituted a serious impediment to the political transition programme in Sierra Leone. It appeared that the Liberian government at a time assisted in the training and arming of the RUF, which was then fighting to unseat the elected government of Tejan Kabba in Sierra Leone. On the other hand, it had been suggested that the armed incursions of dissidents in the north-western (Lofa county) of Liberia could be attributed to Liberian rebels recruited in Sierra Leone, but who felt excluded from the political process by the manner the Lome peace process had been implemented by the Taylor government. Indeed, Lofa County had experienced more internal strife and external attacks from the Guinea border, which led to the massive displacement of its population, including thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees.1 Considerations of strategic interest would seem to indicate a motive for Guinea or even Sierra Leone to seek to intervene in Liberia under serious conflict of interests. A critical observation of the Liberian imbroglio and the...