NBR Analysis: Volume 18

South Korea’s Reactions to China’s “Peaceful Development”

139 South Korea’s Reactions to China’s “Peaceful Development” Jae Ho Chung Jae Ho Chung is Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University, Korea. He can be reached at . [This page intentionally left blank.] 141 chung I f there are countries toward which China has not needed a “charm offensive,” South Korea would certainly be one of them. Over the years many observers were curious about the pace at which South Korea implemented rapprochement with China even before the end of the Cold War. Throughout the 1980s views of China as a potential threat were rare in South Korea. During the 1990s South Korea never regarded China as an imminent threat—in contrast with Japan, which officially listed China as a potential threat. The South Korean Ministry of National Defense’s white papers have devoted only four to five pages to outlining China’s military modernization and inter-military exchanges, underlining the lack of concern within South Korea’s security establishments.1 The fast-growing interdependence between Seoul and Beijing provided additional cement for closer ties between South Korea and China. Two-way trade increased 628 times in 26 years, making China South Korea’s top trading partner and the biggest source of South Korea’s trade surpluses. The annual growth rate of bilateral trade was nearly 30% during 1992–2006. Investment is another pillar of this interdependent relationship between Seoul and Beijing. In 2004 South Korea’s cumulative investment in China ($17.9 billion) outpaced the country’s investment in the United States ($17.1 billion) for the first time. The number of visitors between South Korea and China also surged from 9,000 in 1988 to over 4.8 million in 2006, surpassing the number of visitors between the United States and South Korea. “China” has become a household word in South Korea. The “rise” of China is acutely felt in almost every area, ranging from agriculture and fisheries to the automobile and shipbuilding industries. Under the Roh Moohyun administration, debates were even waged over whether China could constitute a “strategic supplement” to South Korea’s alliance with the United States. In deference to China Seoul has refrained from inviting the Dalai Lama to visit the country—the only democratic government in East Asia to do so. Seoul also took issue with the “strategic flexibility” of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea out of consideration for the adverse implications such flexibility might have for relations with China.2 On the surface it may seem as if certain historically induced positive sentiments are working to draw South Korea increasingly closer to China. South Korea’s favorable views of China, however, may also be construed as “wishful expectations,” driven partly 1 Jae Ho Chung, “Dragon in the Eyes of South Korea: Analyzing Evolving Perceptions of China,” in Korea: The East Asian Pivot, ed. Jonathan D. Pollack (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2006), 258–60. 2 Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), chap. 8. nbr analysis 142 by South Korea’s inherent instincts to balance against Japan and partly by occasional disenchantment with the United States. South Korea’s Evolving Views of China: From Amity to Wariness Once China and South Korea normalized diplomatic relations, the maturation of bilateral economic relations, along with the end of the Cold War, opened up new possibilities for cooperation between Seoul and Beijing beyond merely the economic realm. Seoul’s growing pride—derived from South Korea’s successful democratic transition and strong economic performance—allowed South Korea to pursue a status on a par with the country’s newly acquired capabilities, including searching for ways to reduce heavy dependence on the United States. Given that Washington has assigned an increasingly expanding strategic role to Tokyo irrespective of how such a move would be viewed by Seoul, security cooperation with China grew attractive.3 The Kim Dae Jung administration (1998–2003) inherited the most serious economic crisis that Seoul has ever known. Tied firmly to a web of international financial regimes, South Korea had to rely to a considerable extent on U.S. assistance for economic recovery. Once the economy stabilized, the Kim administration pursued a dual-track strategy, adopting the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea on the one hand and a proactive engagement policy toward China on the other. Neither policy pleased the United States. China...