NBR Analysis: Volume 12

2. India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution

NBR ANALYSIS THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH VOLUME 12, NUMBER 2, MAY 2001 India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution Ashley J. Tellis [This page intentionally left blank.] Foreword India is a nuclear state, and brooding over what the international nonproliferation community should have done to prevent this development is futile. Moreover, New Delhi’s claim that it requires a nuclear deterrent against its main nuclear rival, China, or against an unstable nuclear-capablePakistan,whichmaintainsclosetieswithChina,ishardtorefuteevenwiththe mostcompellingnonproliferationarguments. Atthesametime,givenitslongtraditionofpushingforuniversalandnon-discriminatory disarmament, India’s decision to develop nuclear weapons requires a major strategic shift. In this issue of the NBR Analysis, Dr.AshleyTellis, senior policy analyst at RAND Corporation andprofessorofpolicyanalysisattheRANDGraduateSchool,providesuswithapathbreaking studyonIndia’semergingnucleardoctrine.Ifthereisanythingconspicuous,Dr.Tellisstates,it is this doctrine’s essentially conservative character. Indian policymakers are committed to using their strategic nuclear assets as instruments of retribution in case deterrence fails rather than as tools of defense and warfighting in pursuit of operational advantage. For that reason, Dr. Tellis asserts that Indian nuclear doctrine reflects the lessons of the nuclear revolution, which posit that nuclear weapons, due to their enormous destructive capability, have severed therelationshiptraditionallyexistingbetweentheinstrumentsofviolenceandtheaccumulation of international power. From the perspective of U.S. policy, Dr. Tellis concludes, the best news about India’s emerging nuclear doctrine is that it might dampen rather than accelerate strategic competition in South Asia. The competition between China and India is moderated by these countries’ small arsenals and public commitments to no-first-use policies. In addition, both countries routinely maintain their nuclear capabilities at relatively low levels of readiness. The situation involving India and Pakistan is more problematic, but also offers hope for continued stability. Pakistan is a weak state that is highly concerned about Indian threats to its security. Nonethe49 Richard J. Ellings President The National Bureau of Asian Research less, the prospect is low that India will pursue any military option that places Pakistan in a situation where it has no alternative but to use its nuclear weapons. The costs of a nuclear exchange would be very great indeed. NBR is very pleased to present Dr. Tellis’s study. NBR is currently working to broaden the scope and depth of its SouthAsia program, recent highlights of which include publications by Neil Joeck, Mark Frazier, Anupam Svrivastava, and Xue Litai, in addition to an email discussion forum on SouthAsian security issues. 50 Table of Contents ExecutiveSummary Introduction The Methodological and Substantive Challenges of AnalyzingIndia’sNuclearDoctrine India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Concerns, Contexts, and Constraints The Declaratory Level of Policy Understanding India’sAssessment of “What Deters?” The Ideational Discomfort with NuclearWeaponry TheUniqueDemandsofIndianCivil-MilitaryRelations The Desire to Minimize Strategic Costs The Operational Level of Policy The Centrality of “No First Use” The Optimality of NuclearWeapons for Punishment The Emphasis on “Delayed—ButAssured—Retaliation” TheOptimalityof“CountervaluePlus”Targeting Conclusion Figures Figure 1: India’s National Security Council Figure 2: India’s Higher Defense Organization Figure 3: Indian ChoicesAmidst the Spectrum of Nuclear Strategies Figure 4: India’s LikelyTargeting Strategies 53 59 64 74 75 85 91 93 101 105 109 117 124 140 161 69 95 118 143 [This page intentionally left blank.] India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution Executive Summary After a hiatus of almost 24 years, India startled the world in May 1998 by resuming nucleartestingatatimewhentheinternationalcommunitysolemnlyexpressedadesirethrough the ComprehensiveTest BanTreaty (CTBT) to refrain from the field-testing of nuclear explosives . In the aftermath of these tests, India declared itself to be a “nuclear weapon state” and formally announced its intention to develop a “minimum credible (nuclear) deterrent.” In the face of strong international—and particularly U.S.—pressures to clarify its objectives, the Indian government affirmed that India would behave as a responsible nuclear power and promised to enunciate a nuclear doctrine that would corroborate this claim. This paper analyzesIndia ’semergingnucleardoctrineonboththedeclaratoryandoperationallevelsofpolicy and assesses its implications for regional stability in SouthAsia. In contrast to the views held by many within and outside India, New Delhi does not currently possess or desire to build a ready nuclear arsenal, but instead seeks to develop a “force-in-being,” which can be defined as a nuclear deterrent made up of available, but dispersed , components that can be constituted into a usable weapon system during a supreme emergency. The force will consist of unassembled nuclear warheads, with their sub-components stored separately under civilian control, and delivery systems maintained without their nuclear payloads by the military either...