NBR Analysis: Volume 11

Reforms in the Russian Far East: Implications for Russia’s Security Policy and Nuclear Regionalism

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH NBR ANALYSIS VOLUME 11, NUMBER 4, DECEMBER 2000 Reforms in the Russian Far East: Implications for Russia’s Security Policy and Nuclear Regionalism Foreword Russian Reforms: Implications for Security Policy and the Status of the Military in the Russian Far East Sergey Sevastyanov Russian Nuclear Regionalism: Emerging Local Influences over Far Eastern Facilities James Clay Moltz 119 121 151 [This page intentionally left blank.] Foreword Russia’s economic and political transitions over the past decade have had a dramatic impactonsecuritypolicy,themilitary,andmilitary-industrialcomplexesintheRussianFarEast (RFE).These“transitions,”particularlysubstantiallydecreaseddefensespendingandthedevolutionofpowertoregionalgovernments ,havesignificantimplicationsfordomesticstabilityin RussiaandthecomplexsecurityenvironmentinNortheastAsia.Factoriesthatproducedweapons for the Soviet military now market their arms abroad, lay off workers, or close down. Soldiers and other defense-enterprise workers have gone unpaid, while Russia’s Pacific Fleet and nuclear weapons deteriorate. The essays in this volume, one written by a Russian scholar and the other by anAmerican scholar, provide an interesting perspective on these concerns and suggest policy recommendations for the Russian and U.S. governments. In the first essay Sergey Sevastyanov, professor of political science atVladivostok State University of Economics, explores security policy in the Russian Far East during the reform era.According to Professor Sevastyanov, Russia currently finds itself in an unprecedented position where its primary security concerns are largely internal. These concerns arise primarily from major cuts to defense spending since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s armed forces struggle with inadequate and severely outmoded equipment, and the Pacific Fleet, which had been a valuable asset for Russian diplomacy in theAsia Pacific, is experiencing difficulties in exercises at sea and reciprocating visits to its foreign partners. In order to compensate for the lack of central government funding, a considerable portion of the financial burden for support of the armed forces was transferred to the regional budgets. Because of thesecircumstances,revivalofthemilitarybecameoneoftheclearpoliciesthatgaveVladimir Putin a commanding lead in the March 2000 presidential elections. Putin has stated that the military-industrial complex should serve as a locomotive to haul all civilian sectors of the Russian economy. Indeed, according to Professor Sevastyanov, increasing arms sales toAsia is one of the main tenants of Moscow’s current foreign policy.The author argues, however, that over the long term the RFE must convert most of its economy to civilian purposes, which would be harmonious with the neighboring economies in the region. 119 Richard J. Ellings President The National Bureau of Asian Research In the second essay, James Clay Moltz, research professor and associate director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, analyzes the risk Russia’s economic and political transition poses to the many nuclear facilities located in the Far Eastern region. In particular, Dr. Moltz says, the weakening of centerperiphery relations has created an environment of emerging “nuclear regionalism,” whereby the power to control nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies has begun to devolve from Moscow to regional and local forces—official as well as unofficial. One area of particular concern, according to Dr. Moltz, is the possibility that RFE facilities with nuclear material and technologies might fall under the control of regional mafia groups.Any loss of control at these facilities raises the specter of environmental disaster or proliferation and calls into question Russia’s ability to manage its nuclear infrastructure.According to Dr. Moltz, the goal must be to help Russia reduce its nuclear infrastructure to a point where it will be manageable for the Russiangovernmenttohandleonitsown.Russia’sabilitytomanageitsnuclearfacilitiesinthe Russian Far East is a critical part of the overall future of Russia’s political and economic integrity as a country. Dr. Moltz contends that if the economy recovers and center-region relations become more stable in the coming decade, Russia should gradually be able to deal with a smaller, post-ColdWar nuclear infrastructure. These papers were commissioned as part of NBR’s project Security Implications of Economic and Political Developments in the Russian Far East. NBR is grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of NewYork, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the U.S.-Japan Foundation for their generous support of the project.Afull set of project papers willbepublishedinaneditedvolumeinsummer2001.AswithallNBRstudies,theauthorsare solely responsible for the content and recommendations of their papers. 120 Russian Reforms: Implications for Security Policy and the Status of the Military in the Russian Far East Sergey Sevastyanov Sergey Sevastyanov is professor of political science at Vladivostok State University of Economics. Russia currently finds itself in an unprecedented position in which its...