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TSD—Euphemism for Multiple Alliance?
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43 the national bureau of asian research TSD—Euphemism for Multiple Alliance? Zhu Feng ZHU FENG is Deputy Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Professor in the School of International Studies at Peking University. He can be reached at . Originally published in: William Tow, Michael Auslin, Rory Medcalf, Akihiko Tanaka, Zhu Feng, and Sheldon W. Simon, “Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 16, December 2008.© 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay examines the role that the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD)—a new institution that excludes and appears directed at China—can have in creating true security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. MAIN ARGUMENT For the U.S., the rise of China portends huge risks because Beijing has potential to become a peer competitor; for China, the U.S. is also the largest likely cause of frustration to its own development. By more tightly joining the U.S., Japan, and Australia, the TSD may very well compound rather than alleviate regional instability. POLICY IMPLICATIONS In order to achieve a much broader and more stable regional security arrangement that will stand the test of time, U.S. policymakers need to take a more forward-looking and pragmatic approach to the Asia-Pacific. This would require combining alliance politics with the legitimate security concerns of individual countries. The U.S. should join China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and other states in the Asia-Pacific to create a new and larger security architecture for the region. [18.232.113.65] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 05:44 GMT) 45 TSD—EUPHEMISM FOR MULTIPLE ALLIANCE u FENG 45 T he Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) between the U.S., Japan, and Australia is a means by which the three countries can articulate their common security concerns in the Asia-Pacific. This general purpose aside, the TSD is in effect an important effort to counterbalance China’s rise and military buildup in the region: without the specter of a rising China, Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra would not have begun intensifying defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Concurrent with the development of this new dialogue, however, each country in this alliance is also continuing its own long-standing bilateral engagement with China, relationships that are designed to encourage Beijing to constructively work to enhance the region’s security. This essay poses a number of questions. Can this multilateral TSD-based alienation of China continue to coexist with bilateral policies of engagement with China? Is the TSD likely to evolve into some sort of new, narrowly-based security apparatus designed to make the region more secure by in effect countering China? Alternatively, could the TSD become a parallel complement to the existing regional security architecture, one that both includes China and is aimed at promoting multilateral cooperation in regional security? This essay has four sections. The first examines whether the TSD is in fact a prelude to a wider alliance system. The second section looks at the dialogue not from a strict military-security perspective but rather from the perspective of norms. The next section shows how, regardless of intention, the TSD will create a security dilemma that could have negative consequences for regional stability. A conclusion briefly explores the likelihood of tying the TSD to a wider and more inclusive effort at regional security. The TSD: Prelude to a Wider Alliance? In the eyes of Beijing, the TSD is a prelude to an alliance that will surely, even if slowly over an extended period of time, turn a web of bilaterally based U.S. alliances into a more formal multilateral alliance structure. Such an alliance would exclusively target the rise of China in a way that does not constructively engage China’s own mounting security concerns. The TSD, therefore, contradicts Beijing’s “new security perception” (xin anquan guan) first formulated in the middle of the 1990s, and even highlights U.S. strategic endeavors to weaken or contain China in the AsiaPacific .1 This “perception” strongly stipulates that the exclusion of China from any expansion of allies would be a deliberate isolation of Beijing. Despite repeated assurances from Washington that the United States has neither the will nor interest to encircle or contain China, China’s sense of insecurity is clear given U.S. geopolitical primacy and Washington’s security commitment...