Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: a Japanese Perspective

35 the national bureau of asian research Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: a Japanese Perspective Akihiko Tanaka AKIHIKO TANAKA is Professor of International Politics and Information with the Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies and at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. He can be reached . Originally published in: William Tow, Michael Auslin, Rory Medcalf, Akihiko Tanaka, Zhu Feng, and Sheldon W. Simon, “Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 16, December 2008.© 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This essay overviews Japan’s approach to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD). MAIN ARGUMENT Although Japan has undergone a fairly steady process of normalization in its security policy since the end of the Cold War, the country has failed to devise an enduring and comprehensive international strategy to integrate various policy elements. Japan’s approach to the TSD has also reflected these two trends: on the one hand, the TSD is an element of the “normalization” of Japan’s security policy; on the other hand, the lack of a stable comprehensive national security strategy has complicated Japan’s role in the dialogue. The three prime ministers who have succeeded Koizumi—Abe, Fukuda, and Aso—all tried to reestablish Japan’s international policy in their respective ways. Although the general election that should be held by September 2009 may affect Japan’s international and security policy, the basics of this policy are not likely to change regardless of who wins. The TSD is expected to continue but the scope and concrete modes of operation remain to be clarified. POLICY IMPLICATIONS The critical variables in Japan’s international and security policy may include: • whether or not further normalization of the legal framework continues • whether or not the Japanese government increases the power of the prime minister to formulate and implement international and security policy in a more integrated fashion • whether or not China continues to take a moderate foreign and international policy • what kind of approach the new U.S. administration takes toward international security in the Asia-Pacific As these variables change, the scope and modes of operation of the TSD may vary. 37 TRILATERAL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE u TANAKA 37 A lthough Japan has undergone a fairly steady process of normalization in its security policy since the end of the Cold War, the country has failed to devise an enduring and comprehensive international strategy to integrate various policy elements. On the one hand,Japanhassteadilynormalizedthelegalframeworkforitssecuritypolicy.Legislation has been enacted in the last fifteen years both to deploy the Self-Defense Forces for limited UN peacekeeping operations and to facilitate better coordination with the United Sates in case of East Asian contingencies other than a direct attack on Japan. The Defense Agency was also promoted to the level of a full-fledged ministry in 2007. Though still limited, Japan has been acting more and more like a normal U.S. ally. Japan sent the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to allied ships participating in the operation in Afghanistan. Japan has also sent the Ground Self-Defense Force for humanitarian and reconstruction missions in the southern part of Iraq, and the Air Self-Defense Force for transport cooperation in Iraq. On the other hand, Japan has failed to integrate this evolution of its security policy into a coherent and comprehensive international strategy. Sino-Japanese relations were nearly highjacked by the controversy over Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine.1 Whatever the merit of Koizumi’s view of his visit to the shrine (he believed that China was wrong to interpret his visit as glorifying Japanese militarism in the past), Japan lost maneuverability in policy toward China. Domestic instability after Koizumi’s departure from office has not helped Japan formulate an enduring security strategy. Both Shinzo Abe, Koizumi’s successor, and Yasuo Fukuda, Abe’s successor, were more conscious of Japan’s regional strategy than Koizumi; however, because they pursued two different approaches, the rapid succession from Abe to Fukuda brought about a rather abrupt change of Japan’s regional policy (at least rhetorically). The fact that the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito Party, which controls a two-third majority in the lower house, lost the majority in the upper...