Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty

U.S. Military Modernization: Implications for U.S. Policy in Asia

Executive Summary This paper examines whether U.S. military modernization will enable the U.S. to meet threats to its national security interests that are most likely to arise in Asia. main argument: Despite both geostrategic upheaval (e.g., the rise of China, the nuclearization of North Korea, and the reach of Al Qaeda and affiliates into Asia) and hype over changing U.S. defense policy (e.g., Bush administration revolutions and the RMA), many attributes of U.S. military power are changing only slowly, and most U.S. interests are changing little in Asia. The U.S. remains focused on protecting its security and trade interests and those of its allies, as well as reducing incentives for countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction and engage in conflict with other states. policy implications: • The U.S. would benefit from continuing to prepare for several relatively unchanging military conflict scenarios. Traditional military infrastructure —weaponry, force structure, basing arrangements, and key allies— should thus not be sacrificed in an overzealous belief in the power of rapid defense transformation. • The Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and South Asia are the three areas in the region most likely to require focused U.S. attention. • In order to maximize U.S. ability to meet these and any other challenges in the region, the United States would benefit from: – Maintaining a wide range of military capabilities, including higher-tech “transformative” assets but also large numbers of infantry forces – Operating a wide range of military bases – Maintaining a network of allies and other partners that can assist the United States with forward missions, provide bases and protection of bases, and confer political legitimacy to U.S. military operations United States U.S. Military Modernization: Implications for U.S. Policy in Asia Michael O’Hanlon Is the United States capable of meeting threats to U.S. security interests that are most likely to arise in Asia? In trying to answer this question, one must bear in mind the fact that events and issues originating from outside Asia color U.S. policy toward that region. U.S. military modernization, for example, is determined by both general technological innovations as well as the Pentagon’s generic R&D budget—which are in turn shaped not just by Asia-Pacific concerns but also by the general desire to maintain global dominance across a wide array of warfighting scenarios and capabilities.1 While China may constitute one key motivator for U.S. military investment, there are certainly a host of others. Additional drivers of U.S. military modernization include developments in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions, the war against terrorism, and Washington’s desire to stay ahead of both Russia and China in technological and military modernization efforts. New military technologies then become available for use in the Asia-Pacific region even if they were designed for and motivated by issues in other regions. In sum, U.S. military policy is influenced by both efforts to reinforce U.S. global primacy and consideration of concrete regional scenarios. An analysis of U.S. security capabilities in Asia thus requires an examination of three interrelated issues. The first concerns how the United States both defines its interests (whether globally or in the Asian context) and identifies possible challenges to these interests. Given that policymaking requires the matching of interests with capabilities, the second task is then to 1 See Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001), 12. Michael O’Hanlon is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations. He can be reached at . 2 • Strategic Asia 2005–06 evaluate recent evolutions in general U.S. security doctrine and defense posture , including how these changes have affected U.S. posture in Asia. This examination of both interests and capabilities provides the foundation for a third and final step: an evaluation of whether current U.S. doctrine and defense posture will allow Washington to manage the various challenges to its security interests that are likely to emerge in Asia. These three dimensions —interests, capabilities, and likely future regional scenarios—are respectively taken up in the first three sections of this chapter. The main arguments are as follows. In terms of U.S. interests, Asia is currently undergoing a period of geostrategic...