Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty

Potemkin’s Treadmill: Russian Military Modernization

Executive Summary This chapter examines military modernization in Russia and draws implications for Russia’s defense strategy in Asia. main argument: Despite rising defense outlays, the Russian military is still an archaic, dysfunctional , and inefficient organization. Russia is therefore unlikely to effect military modernization that is capable of fulfilling Moscow’s overly ambitious aims. policy implications: • Absent major governmental, economic, social, and defense reforms, Russian influence in Eurasia (including East Asia) will continue to wane, and demographic and health crises will interact with each other to generate more defense crises in the future. • If major reform does not occur, Russia will lack effective allies and partners , be unable to compete against U.S. primacy in global affairs, and gradually cede its influence in Eurasia to a rising China. • U.S. defense and security cooperation with Russia is possible only in selected and limited areas (e.g., peacekeeping). In order for defense and security cooperation to succeed over the long term, Washington must exert constant pressure on Moscow to democratize. • Because there is no guarantee that Putin’s policies will survive his administration , Russia will likely move in a different direction after he leaves office—hence Moscow is still an unpredictable strategic partner. Russia Potemkin’s Treadmill: Russian Military Modernization Stephen J. Blank Modernization, not reform, characterizes defense policy in Russia today . Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov defines modernization as policies that strengthen the combat capacity as well as the command and control (C2) structures of the armed forces.1 Reforms thus entail the reorganization of force structures as well as the defense economy—a purely bureaucratic and technological orientation that derives from Soviet and Tsarist practice. This study focuses on modernization as defined by Defense Minister Ivanov, which entails neither civil-military issues, strategy, or operations. Although true defense reform—understood as a comprehensive reform of the entire defense and state structure, beginning with the president and embracing all aspects of the military (voyennaya reforma)—is not occurring in Russia, modernization and reform of the armed forces (reforma vooruzhennykh sil’) is finally taking place. The modernization and reforms currently underway, however, eschew political, constitutional, or democratizing reforms and serve to buttress President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime. Since 2003 Ivanov and Putin have subordinated the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), unified all force structures under one territorial command and control structure, and comprehensively transformed Russia’s 1 “Interview with Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov,” Argumenty i Fakty, no. 13, March 30, 2005, 3. Stephen J. Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Blank has been Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1989. He can be reached at . The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. government. 16 • Strategic Asia 2005–06 overall state structure.2 To what extent does this military modernization go beyond mere cosmetic change? Defense reform, if interpreted as the ongoing reorganization of force and bureaucratic structures and the revision of strategy and threat assessment, still falls short. This assessment is based upon a consideration of the strategic environment within which Moscow must operate. The failure of the General Staff until at least 2004 to provide adequate guidance concerning the nature of threats and of contemporary war, the inability to overcome the Soviet legacy in the defense economy and the attendant economic crisis in the defense sector, and the failure to adopt a modern professional army in place of conscription must all be viewed within the greater strategic context. Although defense spending is growing at a high rate, it cannot begin to cover the present size of the armed forces, and further cuts will be necessary. Similarly, the same regression to Soviet and Tsarist habits evident in Russia’s politics and economics is also taking place in the areas of the defense economy and conscription. Russia continues to suffer from a glaring disparity between Moscow’s self-proclaimed ambitions and the leadership’s actual capabilities. Moscow still aspires to a great power role for Russia—despite the fact that it cannot afford this role either economically or militarily. Indeed, Russia’s capacity for power projection, while undergoing reform, still does not stretch beyond the old Soviet boundaries. Thus Moscow must still rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation...