Strategic Asia 2007-08: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy

Political Change in Southeast Asia:Challenges for U.S. Strategy

executive summary This chapter examines the impact of political change in Southeast Asia on U.S. strategic alliances as the U.S. and ASEAN cope with the security implications of China’s rise for the regional balance of power. main argument: U.S. grand strategy in Southeast Asia is focused on maintaining the regional balance of power, which historically has meant a preponderance of U.S. power. To do so at the time when China’s rise is creating region-wide strategic uncertainty, the U.S. must adapt to alterations in the local balance caused by domestic political change within key states. The Philippines and Thailand— U.S. traditional allies—face crises of government legitimacy and military professionalism. Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s rising power, is forming a new strategic partnership with the U.S. Also emerging as a dynamic regional actor, Vietnam sees its relationship with the U.S. as a hedging strategy against China. U.S. relations with Indonesia and Vietnam may be the key points for regional balancing following the war on terrorism. policy implications: • Both the relevance of U.S. traditional Southeast Asian alliances and expenditure of political capital in maintaining them warrant broad consideration in the context of China’s rise. • Security relations with the Philippines and Thailand would benefit from careful managment to ensure that the U.S. is not perceived as a “regime enabler” in the future. • Indonesia’s “strategic partnership” with the U.S. will need approval through Indonesian democratic parliamentary and electoral processes. This will require U.S. appreciation of the country’s Muslim and nationalist sensitivities. • The U.S. would best be sensitive to the constraints China places on how far and fast Vietnam can deepen a security relationship with the U.S. Southeast Asia Political Change in Southeast Asia: Challenges for U.S. Strategy Donald E. Weatherbee For both the United States and the countries of Southeast Asia, the central regional strategic issue is coping with the rise of China. Since 2001, while the United States has been preoccupied with the war on terrorism, an emerging China has pursued an agenda in Southeast Asia that some analysts have seen as rivaling the United States in a zero-sum game for influence. China’s rise has been peaceful, characterized by intensive diplomatic exchange and building economic relationships. China’s rise is occurring in a peaceful, politically stable, and open regional strategic environment that has to date favored the interests of the countries of the region, China, and the United States. No evidence indicates that a fundamental reordering of strategic orientations in the region is taking place. The United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, an intergovernmental organization that encompasses all of the states of the region except East Timor) have worked to foster cooperation with China in areas of mutual interest, including security. Strategic planners, however, must consider possible future divergent interests that would disrupt the prevailing order. A hostile U.S.-China relationship accompanied by Chinese efforts to challenge the U.S. security presence in the subregion would be a strategic nightmare for Southeast Asia. As the Pentagon’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) states, “of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset U.S. traditional military advantages absent U.S. Donald E. Weatherbee is the Donald S. Russell Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of South Carolina. He can be reached at . 236 • Strategic Asia 2007–08 counter strategies.”1 The QDR goes on to point out that “the pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.”2 That pace is accelerating. As a result Southeast Asian countries are concerned over China’s long-range ambitions in the region and the integrity of the U.S. security commitment. The current regional strategic setting is usually, but inaccurately, described as a balance of power. In fact, the United States remains preponderant in the distribution of power. U.S. bilateral alliances with Thailand and the Philippines and the de facto alliance with Singapore are still at the heart of Southeast Asia’s “security architecture,” to use the category of security cooperation and coordination examined by Nick Bisley elsewhere in this volume. In some respects a relic of the Cold War, this traditional alliance system remains the backbone...