Strategic Asia 2008-09: Challenges and Choices

The Iran Nuclear Challenge:Asian Interests and U.S. Policy Options

executive summary This chapter summarizes how major Asian powers see the Iranian nuclear crisis and outlines options for the U.S. to reverse or contain the Iranian nuclear threat. main argument: The U.S. alone cannot stop Tehran from continuing to expand Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium and, ultimately perhaps, to produce nuclear weapons. The cooperation of the major Asian powers is necessary to cause Iranian leaders to reconsider the costs and benefits of continuing not to comply with IAEA and UN Security Council demands. policy implications: All major Asian states would oppose U.S. policies of coercive regime change or military strikes against Iran. This leaves three basic alternative policies: • Accepting uranium enrichment in Iran, under negotiated limits, conditioned on Iranian steps to reassure Israel and other regional states. This option may appeal most to Asian states, given that it would reduce prospects of further sanctions. • Acknowledging Iran’s refusal to comply with UN Security Council demands, withdrawing the positive inducements that have been offered for Iran to cease enrichment, building support among partners for long-term sanctions, and “fortifying” a red line that holds Iran to its commitment not to build nuclear weapons. • Inviting Iran to engage the U.S. on non-nuclear issues in hopes of building the political will later to comply with a temporary nuclear suspension. • To shape the environment for any of these policies, the U.S. could work with Asian powers and Iran’s neighbors either to create a forum for regional cooperation if Iran moves to comply with IAEA and UN resolutions or to coordinate containment if Iran is belligerent. Iran The Iran Nuclear Challenge: Asian Interests and U.S. Policy Options George Perkovich The November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear activities famously concluded that Iran had “halted its nuclear weapons program” in 2003.1 Less famously, the NIE noted that Iran had continued to expand its capacity to enrich uranium, the most difficult step in producing nuclear weapons. This expansion raises warning signs. In violation of nonproliferation obligations, Iran has in the past conducted clandestine nuclear work that Tehran has not fully explained, despite legally binding UN Security Council (UNSC) demands for full transparency and cooperation. Iran will pose a security challenge as long as it continues seeking to produce nuclear materials while both refusing to accede to UNSC demands and threatening other states. It is not the United States primarily, or even alone, that is threatened by Iran’s quest to acquire the technical capacity to make nuclear weapons. Iran’s Arab neighbors and Israel are most adversely affected by the perception that Iran could wield nuclear weapons. Like its Persian antecedents in previous centuries, Iran possesses the size, resources, ambition, and talent to exert major influence in Southwest Asia—from Pakistan to the periphery of Central Asia, Turkey, and the Levant (including Israel and Palestine). Iran could be either a force for instability and insecurity within and among these states or an engine of regional dynamism and wary cooperation. 1 “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence Council, November 2007, 1, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf. George Perkovich is Vice President for Studies–Global Security and Economic Development and Director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He can be reached at . 424 • Strategic Asia 2008–09 The main challenge facing the United States arises from the effects Iran’s nuclear activities and general behavior might have on the U.S. capacity to ensure the security, well-being, and cooperation of Iran’s neighbors. If they feel threatened and believe Iran could deter the United States from intervening on their behalf, some of these neighboring countries will be inclined to hedge their positions by accommodating Tehran in ways that could diminish Washington’s influence in the region. The United States also has led efforts to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. If Iran were to get away with breaking nonproliferation rules and defying the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNSC to enforce those rules, the risks of a more anarchic nuclear order would grow dramatically, threatening a top U.S. national security priority. The United States alone cannot reduce this threat by inducing Tehran to alter Iran’s nuclear activities. To change Iran’s strategy and behavior, the United States will need the cooperation of the European Union (EU), Russia...