Strategic Asia 2010-11: Asia's Rising Power and America's Continued Purpose

The Geopolitics of Strategic Asia, 2000–2020

executive summary This chapter examines a range of possible geopolitical futures for Strategic Asia and evaluates the likelihood of each outcome based on the prospective performances of the U.S. and Chinese economies, potential political reform in China, and other factors. main argument: No student of geopolitics should be surprised by the conclusion that the future shape of Strategic Asia will be determined in large part by the power and preferences of its two biggest players. If China’s economy falters, the U.S. will remain dominant in at least the eastern portion of this vast domain. If the U.S. stumbles, on the other hand, the chances of Chinese hegemony will grow. If both powers remain strong and engaged, Strategic Asia will likely be split along geographic and ideological lines. The probability of other scenarios will depend on factors that lie outside the realm of normal geopolitical calculation. It is much easier to imagine the U.S. and China collaborating to keep order in Asia if they share the same democratic values and institutions. Similarly, an East Asian community modeled on the European Union is more likely if China liberalizes than if it does not. policy implications: • The geostrategic future of Asia will depend on whether China continues to rise, whether the U.S. retains the economic resources and political will to stay engaged in the region, and on the choices and preferences of the two powers. • Current trends suggest that Chinese hegemony or the division of the region into continental and maritime spheres of influence is most likely. • Given the unlikelihood that China will undergo significant political reform in the near future, the U.S. must craft its regional strategy without counting on a liberal regional partner. Geopolitics The Geopolitics of Strategic Asia, 2000–2020 Aaron L. Friedberg Despite changes in technology, patterns of economic exchange, the role of nonstate actors, and the increasing prominence of international rules and institutions, the stability and character of relations in any system of states is still largely determined by the distribution of power among those states. Moreover, despite the increasing attention paid in recent years to “soft power,” “smart power,” and other similar concepts, “hard power”— measured roughly by the size and sophistication of a nation’s economic, scientific, and industrial base, and the quality and quantity of its armed forces—remains the essential currency of politics among nations. Finally, despite the globalization of the international economy and the growing interconnectedness of all parts of the planet, in the strategic realm, where geography, topography, and distance remain critical, it still makes sense to think in terms of regional systems (or subsystems) and power balances.1 Serious analysis of the international politics of specific regions, and of the world as a whole, must begin with a consideration of the distribution of hard power. It cannot end there, however. Instead of being fixed, the power balance is constantly changing, sometimes rapidly, thanks to differences in economic growth rates, levels of technological sophistication, and military expenditures. Albeit to varying degrees, these are variables over which national decisionmakers generally have at least some measure of control. 1 Portions of this paper were originally presented at the 12th Asian Security Conference on “Asian Strategic Futures 2030: Trends, Scenarios and Alternatives,” organized by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, February 11–13, 2010. Aaron L. Friedberg is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. He can be reached at . 26 • Strategic Asia 2010–11 The shifting structure of power shapes the parameters within which states must act, setting limits on what they can achieve and creating imperatives that they ignore at their peril. How quickly and in precisely what ways states react to changing material conditions will depend on their goals and strategies. These, in turn, are the product of a variety of tangible and intangible factors, including the perceptions of key individuals, the power of various societal groups, the domestic political regimes within which they operate, and the content of prevailing ideologies. Structure is important, but so too is strategy. To paraphrase Marx, “nations make their own histories, but they do not make them just as they please.” These basic insights and beliefs have informed the Strategic Asia Program since its inception. Successive volumes in this series have sought to look forward as well as backward, speculating in a disciplined way about where the confluence of underlying trends and evolving...