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55 the national bureau of asian research nbr project report | september 2008 Prosperity’s Children: Generational Change and Japan’s Future Leadership J. Patrick Boyd & Richard J. Samuels J. Patrick Boyd is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a research associate at Waseda University. He has published his work in Policy Studies and Ronza and can be reached at . Richard J. Samuels is Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His most recent book is Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (2007). Dr. Samuels can be reached at . Note The authors are grateful to Professor Kabashima Ikuo and Assistant Professor Okawa Chihiro for their generous permission to use the data from the 2005 Asahi Shimbun-Tokyo University Elite Survey (ATES). We also wish to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Maeda Kentaro, Tatsumi Yasuaki, Ogata Hiroaki, and Kiyomi Boyd. We are indebted to Ellis Krauss, T.J. Pempel, Mary Alice Haddad, Kenneth Pyle, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. An abridged version of this research paper appeared in Asia Policy, no. 6 (July 2008). Executive Summary This study measures generational differences in the views of Japanese legislators across three key areas of Japan’s political discourse—economic policy, security policy, and cultural issues related to right-wing nationalism. The study then explores the policy implications of these differences through three plausible midterm scenarios. Main Findings The study of generational differences provides only a limited explanation for the dynamics of Japanese politics. (1) Generational differences are most significant in domestic economic policy, where the eldest cohort favors maintaining the institutions of Japanese-style capitalism more than both younger cohorts. (2) Although the youngest cohort favors more muscular security policies than do the elder cohorts, only one instance of this generational difference proves statistically significant. (3) Even though there are no statistically significant differences between generations on cultural issues related to right-wing nationalism—an unexpected finding in itself—that the midcareer cohort, which is the primary object of this study, is more progressive than the other cohorts in this area is surprising. Policy Implications Given that generational differences in two of the three most salient dimensions of Japanese • • politics are statistically significant in only a few instances, the findings of this study do not support expectations for impending policy transformation based on generational change. Japanese leaders are likely to continue trying to reform the domestic economy, especially • • in areas such as fiscal policy and public works. U.S. and Japanese alliance managers should expect continued support from Tokyo for • • enhanced Japanese roles and missions over the medium term despite an increasing number of questions over U.S. motives and intentions. Because the range of security and economic policy preferences is less extreme than is • • sometimes presumed, U.S. policymakers should not overreact when Japanese leaders question U.S. policies. Barring an unforeseen event, the study finds no evidence that right-wing nationalism in • • Japan will become a major problem for U.S.-Japan relations. [18.221.85.33] Project MUSE (2024-04-18 08:26 GMT) 57 Prosperity’s Children u Boyd & Samuels A new generation of politicians will rise to occupy the highest positions of political leadership in Japan over the next five to fifteen years. In the course of this transition these future leaders will face challenges both new and old. On the one hand, they will need to navigate a political landscape in which many traditional “paths to power”— the stepping stones in career trajectories leading to the highest party and government posts— appear to have been undermined by over a decade of electoral, campaign finance, and party reforms; by the development of a nascent two-party system; and by increased volatility in voting patterns among the electorate. On the other hand, these new leaders will be called on to deal with difficult issues long on the national agenda, such as constitutional revision, the pressing need to reform government spending practices, and demands from both home and abroad for Japan to assume a more activist security posture. How will members of this new generation respond to this changed—and still changing—political environment? Will they cohere as an identifiable group with shared values and preferences? Will they fragment into different policy camps due to fundamental differences in political orientations? Will the new distribution of values and preferences differ...

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