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CHAPTER 1 Congressional Influence on China Policy and the CCP’s Reaction, 1949–1951 Despite the voluminous and diverse studies on U.S.-China relations between 1949 and 1951, Congress’s role in China policy during that time is rarely closely examined, and the CCP’s reactions to Congress’s China policy are seldom investigated at all.1 Historians generally cite the intense China policy debates in the late 1940s and early 1950s as evidence that Congress did not always agree with the administration’s China policy; scholars still differ on the part Congress played in shaping China policy during this period.2 A review of the literature reveals that little attention has been paid to Congress’s China trade embargo legislation. When trade policy is analyzed, it is seen as an extension of the president’s overall China policy. Some researchers conclude that the China trade embargo began and ended with the executive branch, neglecting the role Congress played and not mentioning the impact of legislation on U.S.-China relations.3 To achieve a better understanding of China policymaking and its impact on Beijing, this chapter places the congressional role in the broader context of Sino-American relations, examining Congress’s attitudes and 15 actions toward crucial policy decisions, such as the recognition of Beijing , the defense of Taiwan, Beijing’s admission to the United Nations, economic aid to the Nationalists, and the China trade embargo. This chapter also describes Beijing’s response to Congress’s actions. Challenging conventional scholarship, this chapter argues that Congress did play a significant part in China policy and had an impact on the CCP’s U.S. policy from 1949 to 1951. THE BACKGROUND: THE 1948 CHINA AID ACT By mid-1946, the Truman administration had concluded that the GMD under Chiang Kai-shek could not defeat the CCP under Mao Zedong; the GMD could not dominate all of China by force of arms. General George Marshall, then a special presidential representative, was sent to China in an attempt to bring the GMD and CCP together in a coalition government. Marshall’s most powerful diplomatic weapon in coping with Chiang was the potential termination of U.S. aid, but Congress’s outspoken support of the GMD greatly reduced the possibility of its actual use. Marshall believed that he was able to stop any China aid bills from being introduced in Congress, but Chiang, aware of a congressional request for economic and military aid to the Nationalists, attempted to solve the problem by force, believing that American aid would be available if the Nationalists defeated the Communists.4 After the failure of the Marshall mission in late 1946, fighting erupted between the Nationalists and Communists. Consequently, congressional disapproval of Truman’s China policy and calls for aid to the Nationalists increased. China policy became a congressional battlefield. On January 11, 1947, Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg called on the administration to abandon its policy of establishing a coalition government and to help the Nationalists gain control over all of China. Some congressional Republicans answered Vandenberg’s call, among them Walter Henry Judd. Judd, a former missionary in China, had won the Republican nomination for the fifth congressional district in the Minnesota priCongressional Influence on China Policy, 1949–1951 16 2.14.221.113] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 11:27 GMT) maries of 1942 and the general election in November of that year. He soon emerged as the most forceful spokesman in Congress for the Nationalists . In 1947, Judd became a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , a position that helped him play a substantial part in encouraging Congress to pay more attention to East Asia and its problems.5 The military failures of the Nationalist forces in the civil war in the spring of 1947 persuaded the pro-Chiang congressman that if the United States wanted to keep its influence in China, it was time to provide the Nationalist government with economic and military aid, while Chiang Kai-shek requested the same thing—extensive economic assistance— from Truman. The president did try to help Chiang, but not on a large scale. On May 26, 1947, the administration repealed the ten-month-old embargo on consignments of American arms and munitions to China. In July, at the request of Representative Judd, Truman sent General Albert Wedemeyer, former commander of American forces in China, on a factfinding mission. In the summer, American Marines transferred sixty-five hundred tons of munitions and weapons to the...

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