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CHAPTER 2 Congressional China Inquests and the McCarran Act, 1950–1952 There were twenty-four investigations of Communism and subversion during the Eighty-first Congress (1949–51), and the number climbed to thirty-four in the Eighty-second Congress. The congressional hearings generated an enormous amount of scholarly writings, but little of the literature examines Congress’s investigation, driven by Senator Joseph McCarthy, of China policy in general and the investigation’s long-term impact on China policy in particular.1 Under the powerful influence of McCarthyism, Congress passed the McCarran Internal Security Act in 1950, an anti-Communism statute, to start the purge of Communists and Communist sympathizers in the United States. Some writings have discussed the McCarran Act, but current literature investigates little of the effect of this law on Chinese scientists in the United States. This chapter first examines three congressional hearings and their impact on China policy in the 1950s and 1960s and then studies the impact of the antiCommunism campaign under the Internal Security Act on Chinese scientists in the United States and Beijing’s policy toward the purge of the Chinese scientists.2 This chapter argues that Congress had direct 79 influence on China policy during that time and in the long run due to the impact of McCarthyism on the U.S. government and American people . In addition, the anti-Communism purge under the McCarran Act prompted CCP leaders to talk with Americans about the return of Chinese scientists in the United States, scientists who later helped China develop nuclear bombs in the 1960s. THE TRIUMPH OF THE CCP AND THE RISE OF MCCARTHY Pro-Nationalist Republicans in Congress had been criticizing the administration ’s East Asian policy since the beginning of World War II. During the war, they demanded more focus on the Asia-Pacific theater, and after the war, disapproving of the State Department’s policy bias toward Europe , they persisted in requiring more American aid for Chiang Kaishek ’s Nationalists, on the grounds that congressional bipartisanship had supported the administration in fighting the cold war in Europe, thus obligating the administration to restrain the Communists—especially the Chinese Communists—in East Asia. The Chinese Communists controlled almost the whole of mainland China by June 1949, and the defeat of the Nationalist forces seemed inevitable . To the Republican legislators, Truman’s China policy had failed during the Chinese civil war between 1946 and 1949. The pro-Nationalist Republicans in Congress criticized the State Department frequently and severely, using the obvious “loss” of China to launch a devastating attack on President Truman and his advisers, although the State Department had issued white papers in August 1949 to defend China policy.3 Believing that the Communist victory in China had shaken American supremacy in Asia, congressional legislators were seeking a scapegoat to blame for this “tragedy,” especially among those who had made and executed China policy. More and more congressional Republicans were realizing that Asian policy was a potential weapon to weaken the Democrats in the upcoming congressional election. Prediction in this matter Congressional China Inquests and the McCarran Act, 1950–1952 80 8.220.81.106] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 17:24 GMT) was significantly enhanced as the debate on the collapse of the Nationalist government gradually became associated with the issue of Communist penetration of the administration, particularly the Department of State. Some Republicans charged that pro-Communist officials in the Department of State had greatly influenced China policy between 1945 and 1949, an accusation that led to an intense assault on the State Department at the start of 1950. For Republicans such as Senator William Knowland and Congressman Walter Judd, the China issue was destroying the bipartisan consensus that had helped make foreign policy after World War II. The loss of China was just what Joseph McCarthy needed. On February 9, 1950, McCarthy, an unknown junior senator from Wisconsin, became a national star when he declared at Wheeling, West Virginia, that he had a list of at least 205 people who were members of the Communist Party and who were still working and shaping U.S. foreign policy, known to the Secretary of State. From the beginning, many of McCarthy’s charges focused on China, including allegations that Alger Hiss as well as other State Department officials had obviously given up China to the Russians during the Yalta Conference in early 1945. He also alleged that John Stewart Service, the China expert, had released documents to the editor of...

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