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Carrie L. Bates 151 Self-Identity in Epictetus: Rationality and Role Carrie L. Bates Introduction One goal of philosophers is to provide coherent, logically consistent answers to the questions with which they engage. Stoic philosophy, which flourished from about 300 BCE to CE 200, engages with the question of what constitutes the best life for a human being to live. Stoics posit happiness (eudaimonia) as the chief end of human beings and their highest good. “Philosophical eudaimonia is a condition in which a person of excellent character is living optimally well, flourishing, doing admirably, and steadily enjoying the best mindset that is available to human beings” (Long, Epictetus, 193).1 For Stoics, care of the self is the means to that end. In order to care for the self, one must know the identity of that self.2 Is Stoic teaching about self-identity and eudaimonia coherent? A charitable and close reading of Epictetus provides a positive answer to this question, even though there is much at first glance that seems to be contradictory in Epictetus’s teaching. The charitable reading that I propose allows a picture to emerge of “a remarkable historical figure and […] thinker whose recipe for a free and satisfying life can engage our modern selves, in spite of our cultural distance from him” (Long, Epictetus, 3). In this paper, I will argue that the key ingredient in Epictetus’s recipe for a flourishing life is his concept of self-identity (that which constitutes the self) as something that is both essential (innate, natural) and constructed. It is easy to read Epictetus’s teaching (preserved by Arrian in The Discourses or The Encheiridion)3 simply as a group of moral maxims and to thus 1 Bibliographic information for all references can be found in the Select Bibliography at the end of this essay. 2 Throughout this paper, I use the word identity in a way that differs from the philosophical problem of identity, explored in thought experiments such as the “Ship of Theseus”. I use identity as shorthand to refer to what constitutes the self in Epictetus’s brand of Stoicism. 3 The teachings of Epictetus have come to us through his disciple Arrian and in the sub-literary form of a diatribe. The diatribe was in use from about the fifth century BCE to the fifth century CE; it consisted of a stenographic record of the schoolroom activity that accompanied the instructor’s reading of a text and his detailed exegesis of that text. The remarks thus preserved were offhand remarks made between students and teacher with regard to a specific text, the identity 152 EPICTETUS: his continuing influence and contemporary relevance draw incorrect conclusions about Epictetus’s coherency on the matter of selfidentity . What he says in one place seems to contradict what he says in others. Sometimes he speaks of a single, universal, human nature, referring to it as divinely established. Other times, he mentions distinct male and female natures, and classifies those as divinely bestowed.4 The divine origin of a nature provides a reason to think of that nature as essential/innate, and Epictetus classifies contrary natures (a single universal nature and distinct multiple natures) as divine in origin. Does Epictetus envision a single human nature, or does he posit two distinct kinds of human nature: a male human nature and a separate female human nature? The answer is crucial if I am to know my own self-identity and, knowing that, to care for that self so that I can reach eudaimonia. Given Epictetus’s seemingly contradictory or careless remarks on the nature of human beings, we are justified in asking if he perceives eudaimonia as gendered: does he think that there is a male eudaimonia and a female eudaimonia? As we seek to answer this question, we must keep several factors in mind. We must consider the cultural context—his audience, his setting, and his purpose. We must also remember that we have lost much of what he actually said, as well as much of what he would have communicated by gesture and intonation. Finally, we resolve apparent contradictions when we understand that Epictetus’s teaching on self-identity has two aspects: a primary/essential aspect and a secondary/constructed aspect. This paper addresses that dual aspect of self-identity. The Primary/Essential Aspect of Self-Identity: Rationality The primary/essential aspect of self-identity focuses on the absolute and universal nature of human beings as rational creatures. Epictetus insists...

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