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Matthias Rothe 131 Kant and Epictetus. Transformations of Imperial Stoicism Matthias Rothe 1. Reception or Appropriation? An affinity between Kant’s moral theory and Stoic ethics has often been noted and occasionally discussed, most recently by Maximilian Forschner (Oikeiosis), Julia Annas (Morality), Ulrike Santozki (Bedeutung antiker Theorien, 23–25), and Thomas Bénatouïl (Les Stoïciens, 92–96).1 What, though, is the nature of this affinity? How might we account for it? In my view, it is quite clear that in those rare cases where Kant explicitly discusses Stoic concepts, or even credits the Stoics with insights important to his own theory,2 he does not simply copy their ideas or discuss them for the sake of critical review. He substantially transforms them. This transformation is not a matter of intellectual dishonesty, nor, I would argue,shoulditbeunderstoodasevidenceofbadfaith;itissomethingunavoidable. There is no such thing as an unobstructed dialogue between schools of philosophy or great thinkers across time and space. Ideas and arguments are not merely “received”; they are always “appropriated” to serve historically specific purposes. To be sure, intellectual dishonesty and bad faith exist. However, evidence of this necessarily depends upon a proper reconstruction of the “conditionings” to whichthetheoristsinquestionweresubject.Onlywhentheseareclearlydelineated will it be possible to consider whether a gesture of bad faith is involved. First of all, Kant’s appropriation of Stoicism seems to be conditioned by certain theoretical preconceptions. He understood all philosophical endeavors that preceded the critical turn he himself had initiated to be, as Ulrike Santozki convincingly argues (Bedeutung antiker Theorien, 23–25), a mere “groping around” and accordingly, each insight a result of blind luck. Kant saw himself, then, in the fortunate position of systematizing in terms of merits or failures by determining whether the limits of knowing, imposed by the nature of reason, 1 Bibliographic information for all references can be found in the Select Bibliography at the end of this essay. (Immanuel Kant’s works are quoted after the academy edition, unless stated otherwise, and translated by the author.) 2 Compare for example Kant’s discussion of the interconnection between happiness and virtue in Stoic philosophy (AA V, 112), the Stoic idea of the wise man and of duty (AA V, 125–127) in Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, of the role the Stoics assign to moral exercises in Metaphysik der Sitten (AA VI, 484), or the Stoic theory of evil in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft (AA VI, 57–59) and in Vorarbeiten zur Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft (AA XIII, 107). 132 EPICTETUS: his continuing influence and contemporary relevance had been respected, presupposed, or violated. Philosophies that preceded the criticalturnconstituted,forhim,anopenandresonatingspaceratherthanathick and impenetrable matter that required detailed philological study, and those well-known and rigid distinctions that represent the critical turn—this cannot be emphasized enough—are his steadfast tools of observation (classification): theory vs. practice; the intelligible vs. the sensual/empirical; constitutive (a priori) vs. operative (a posteriori) reason; or knowledge vs. morality. While each of these divisions diverges from ancient ethics, the latter two in particular are in full rupture with it. Given this, any idea or arguments that would comply with his theoretical frame necessarily had to change substantially. A famous example of such a “reconfiguration” is Kant’s understanding of Aristotelian prudence (phronêsis).3 Whereas the Aristotelian concept seems to presuppose a distinction between two kinds of theory—practical wisdom and contemplative wisdom—Kant relegates prudence to the realm of blind practice (the empirical) as opposed to theory (the intelligible). Furthermore, whereas for Aristotle the prudent man’s (phrônimos) task is to work out each time anew the only right thing to do, and thereby emerge victorious through changing circumstances (thus re-establishing a law), Kant defines prudence as a—each time anew—flexible calculation of means and ends. This is because no ultimate endcanbedefined,ormorallawobtained,withinever-changingcircumstances.4 Hence prudence and cleverness, for Aristotle strict opposites, become in Kant’s discussion one and the same, deprived of any moral value and pitted against actions guided by a priori principles.5 But the theoretical stance taken by Kant was itself subject to impersonal or epistemic rules, a historical conditioning, so to speak. It had become necessary to rethink moral categories for the project of a society of potential equals, and to explain the existence of society without reference to a divine or secular government. Stoic philosophy seems to have provided conceptual material particularly suitable for these objectives. After all, Stoicism...

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