New Essays on Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy

8. Taming Resentment

Michael S. Pritchard 151 Taming Resentment Michael S. Pritchard PREFATORY COMMENTS Eighteenth-century Scotland’s three most renowned philosophers, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid, were familiar with and admired the work of their English predecessor Joseph Butler. Smith and Reid made explicit use of Butler’s account of resentment in their writings.1 Hume did not. Why he chose not to is unclear. Reid employed it in his critique of Hume’s moral theory—in particular, Hume’s handling of the challenge of the sensible knave. Smith, as I will show, could have done this as well; but he did not explicitly do so. However, a careful reading of Smith’s account of resentment in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) reveals important differences between Smith and Hume, despite their obvious admiration of each other’s work. On these points of difference, Smith and Reid can be joined as allies.2 What follows is an exploration of the role of resentment in Smith and Reid’s accounts of morality, both as a point of departure from Hume’s account of justice and as providing an important link to Smith’s Wealth of Nations. “UNSOCIAL PASSIONS” The Theory of Moral Sentiments opens with the firm assurance that human selfishness is limited. It is a principle of human nature, says Smith, that we care about the fortune of others, as evidenced by the pleasure we often get from witnessing their happiness. Even the “greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society” is not immune to having some degree of pity or compassion for the misery of others. Thus, we have sympathies that express genuine concern about others, not just ourselves. Given this initial appeal to our compassion for others, we might expect Smith’s subsequent account to dwell on the positive. However, Smith quickly turns to our nasty side, to what he calls the “unsocial passions”—most notably, resentment. Such passions, he says, “excite no sort of sympathy, but 1 Butler’s account of resentment is found in Fifteen Sermons, originally published in 1730. See, especially, Sermon VIII, “Upon Resentment”. Complete bibliographic information for references can be found in the Select Bibliography at the end of this essay. 2 It should be pointed out, however, that Reid’s critique of Smith’s TMS is as trenchant as his critique of Hume. Reid’s criticisms of Smith can be found in his “Review of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, by Adam Smith”. 152 new essays on adam smith’s moral philosophy before we are acquainted with what gave occasion to them, serve rather to disgust and provoke us against them” (TMS, 11). Furthermore, resentment is especially morally suspect. Smith warns us, “There is no passion, of which the human mind is capable, concerning whose justice we ought to be so doubtful, concerning whose indulgence we ought so carefully to consult our natural sense of propriety, or so diligently to consider what will be the sentiments of the cool and impartial spectator” (TMS, 37). Finally, insofar as it is merely an expression of hatred and anger, resentment is “the greatest poison to the happiness of a good mind” (TMS, 37). Given such an indictment, shouldn’t we strive to rid ourselves of this poison? No, says Smith, for resentment “is the safeguard of justice and the security of innocence” (TMS, 79). It is a defensive response that “prompts us to beat off the mischief which is attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that which is already done; that the offender may be made to repent of his injustice, and that others through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offense” (TMS, 79). That is, this is how resentment ought to function, at least among moral agents. However, in fact, it does so much more—and worse. It is prone to various excesses; and indeed, one of the tasks of moral education is to teach us to reign in these excesses. This is not a matter of attempting to eliminate resentment, rather, the task is to tame it. Much of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is an account of what this requires and how it might be accomplished. Excessive hatred and resentment, Smith admonishes, “renders a person the object of universal dread and abhorrence, who, like a wild beast, ought, we think, to be hunted out of all civil society” (TMS, 40). Nevertheless, Smith believes, our resentment can be tamed...