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SECTION FOUR POLITICAL FREEDOMS AND DEMOCRACY BY THAPELO NDLOVU Botswana is one of the most politically stable countries in Africa. On gaining independence in 1966, the country immediately adopted the multiparty system, against the trend of oneparty States prevailing across the continent. Elections held at five-year intervals have entrenched confidence in Botswana’s system and attracted accolades on the continent and beyond. The regular changes in the office of Head of State since the tenure of President Sir Ketumile Masire have made the system more trustworthy. The international community has questioned neither the quality of the democracy , nor the country’s human rights record, always comparing them favourably with the situation in the rest of Africa. Little attention has been given to the fact that, over the years, Botswana has actually become a de facto one-party State. The former United States ambassador , Mr Joseph Huggins, observed that the approach of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) to governance was assimilationist and aimed at extending executive power (US 66 A FINE BALANCE: ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE IN BOTSWANA IDASA’S DEMOCRACY INDEX Embassy Gaborone 2005). This shift has been attributed to weak opposition parties that are not able to challenge the ruling party at national level (Phirinyane et al. 2006). It is however submitted that Botswana never had the key characteristics usually identified with proper respect for human rights or democracy. Most conspicuous in its absence is a human rights commission (Ombudsman, annual report 2004). Another democratic defect is that the ruling party has always enjoyed unfair access to State resources, particularly the State media, which is the most powerful weapon for a political player. Further, few African countries have progressed enough to accept the importance of capable opposition parties. Many ruling parties in Africa, including Botswana, take advantage of resource-poor opposition parties that are unable to take them to task effectively. Opposition parties are unable to access State broadcasters, which makes it difficult for them to reach remote populations (Teshome B. 2009). Over the years, Botswana’s democracy has stagnated and, in some respects, actually showed signs of regression. A number of observers point to the Constitution, which is viewed as archaic and not progressive (Botswana Congress Party n.d.). In a recent paper, three University of Botswana academics, Mokganedi Zara Botlhomilwe, Professor David Sebudubudu and Bugalo Maripe, observe that ‘Botswana can no longer be regarded as an “African miracle” given that the new democratic regimes in the region have surpassed her in upholding basic democratic principles’ (Botlhomilwe et. al. 2011). With only a few years left to achieve Botswana’s Vision 2016, the country is unlikely to reach some of its goals. In particular, goals envisaging a prosperous and democratic nation are under threat. The 2011 annual Vision 2016 awards were dominated by just one pillar of the vision, that of ‘A compassionate, just and caring nation’, and there were no nominees in the category of ‘An open, democratic and accountable nation’ (Keoreng 2011). The nominations were made by members of the public in a radio phone-in programme, as well as via self-nomination. There are various possible reasons for the public’s failure to point to deserving individuals or institutions, but it appears to reflect the underutilisation of democracy by the people of Botswana. This view is contradicted, however, by the results of the Afrobarometer survey of 2008 (University of Botswana Faculty 2008). The report documents that 91% of people polled were satisfied with the country’s democracy, with 56% regarding Botswana as a full democracy. A more plausible possibility is that the people of Botswana could have bought into President Ian Khama’s dismissal of politics as ‘dirty’ (Burgis 2009). Another indicator that could be helpful in diagnosing Botswana’s democracy is the state of its democratic institutions, both statutory and non-statutory. Those that are supposed to be directly linked to human rights, such as the Office of the Ombudsman and the Intelligence Security Tribunal, are either handicapped by their organisational structures, as is the former (Ombudsman 2008), or entirely handpicked by the president without any effective oversight , such as the latter. The Ombudsman’s report of 2004 decried the fact that it could not be referred directly to parliament, but had to be submitted to the president. This reporting line has, in the past, compromised the role of the Ombudsman. A case in point involved the use of the State helicopter by the then vice-president, Lieutenant Ian Khama. The...

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