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29 Introduction Neighbouring governments’ policies and responses to the developing crisis1 in Zimbabwe have since 2000 attempted to reduce violence and strengthen democracy in the country while supporting to varying degrees the government and its leader, Robert Mugabe. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) made efforts to end violence during the parliamentary elections in 2000. However, these efforts over the last decade have not been consistent, nor has SADC remained united in its views of the crisis. The governments led by former liberation movements (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa) have tended to be more favourably inclined toward Mugabe and ZANU-PF than those others which did not engage in armed struggle, that is, Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. Tanzania and Zambia were highly supportive of the liberation movements. As the Zimbabwe crisis has unfolded it has produced varied responses not just from governments but also from opposition parties. The exodus of Zimbabweans throughout the region has pressured existing regional immigration policies, government policies toward Zimbabwe, and internal political debates and conflicts about how to deal with it. Reactions to these displacements will be considered in this chapter, as will the media coverage of Zimbabwe. In particular we are interested in the varied understandings, responses and policies produced by the Zimbabwe crisis and displacements. The South African government has taken the lead both within and beyond SADC.2 In particular, former president Thabo Mbeki played the central role in negotiations with the government of Zimbabwe to reduce the use of force and violence. Mbeki’s role has now been assumed by South Africa’s current president, Jacob Zuma. In general he is viewed as less sympathetic to Mugabe 2 Reflections on National Dynamics, Responses and Discourses in a Regional Context Randi Kaarhus, Bill Derman and Espen Sjaastad In the Shadow of a Conflict 30 Map 1: SADC countries, with Zimbabwean border crossing points covered in this book [3.144.17.45] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 06:05 GMT) 31 Reflections on national dynamics, responses and discourses… and ZANU-PF but this may have more to do with the general swing of SADC away from supporting Mugabe and his party.3 This chapter is organized as follows. After briefly examining how SADC, but also the Commonwealth,4 among others, attempted to respond to some of the watershed moments in the Zimbabwean conflict, we then turn to more specific and detailed considerations of how South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia responded to events. Zimbabwe and SADC after 2000 Changes in how the region viewed Zimbabwe were due first to the defeat of the ZANU-PF constitution in the 2000 referendum and the subsequent violent parliamentary elections, which almost produced an MDC victory despite the violence. Mugabe embarked on a campaign of sustained violation of human rights, the abandonment of the rule of law, and the occupation of most whiteowned farms.5 It is important to note that there were strong internal efforts to find solutions to what was thought to be the heart of the crisis, namely land. The Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI) was established, with the purpose of making one million hectares of uncontested land across all provinces and agroecological zones available for resettlement. On 5 September 2001, in what was described as a ‘historic step’ by the Commercial Farmers Union,6 a proposed 531 farms totaling 976,452 hectares were accepted by the Acting President Joseph Msika on behalf of the government.7 The agreement was terminated upon the return of the President, who refused to accept the farmers’ offer. Two external efforts were undertaken in order to find solutions to the crises. The first was by the Commonwealth7 and the second by SADC.8 The Commonwealth held an emergency meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in September 2001 in an attempt to prevent Zimbabwe from being expelled from the Commonwealth , by assisting Mugabe to implement his agrarian reform programme in an orderly and sustainable manner. The outcome of the meeting was an agreement that acknowledged that the situation in Zimbabwe was extremely serious, posing ‘a threat to the socio-economic stability of the entire sub-region and the continent at large’. The parties agreed that ‘land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe and cannot be separated from other issues of concern to the Commonwealth such as the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and the economy’. It was resolved that Zimbabwe would put an end to all illegal occupations of white-owned farmland and return...

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