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Chapter 2 Political Violence and the Scramble for Resources Introduction What explains the propensity to violence in the colonial and post-colonial contexts? Our Zimbabwean case strongly suggests that it is not a behavioural or psychological tendency but a compulsivescrambleforresourcesofpoliticalpower and economic benefit, and by extension, defence of these resources and privileges once they have been appropriated. Colonial violence was endemic during both conquest and in the maintenance of material resources that were expropriated or generated, and in the repressionofchallengestothisstateofaffairs.Nationalistviolencebecamenecessary in the wresting of power from the colonial establishment where and when it was reluctantorslowinrespondingtodemandsforindependence.Butinter-partyviolence amongst nationalists themselves was an expression of intense competition for the prize of political office at independence.The party which won most seats and votes provided the first post-independence government and leader.The attainment of a ‘political kingdom’ would open vistas of accumulation and wealth through the state. In this chapter, we seek to explain why and how violence has been an instrument and method of choice in the scramble for both political and economic power.This does not imply that practitioners or ‘foot-soldiers’ necessarily understand violence in such terms. The real objectives of violence may not be explained to them but, rather, spurious objectives may be given to them by leaders or organizers of the violence. The planners of violence can be distinct from the practitioners of the activity. Planners can manipulate the practitioners. There is a common tendency to view violence as spontaneous or random. Sustained political violence is likely to be planned and calculated rather than random. Political violence is a strategy with a specific aim. It can be a method to obtain power or leverage, to intimidate or force concessions, or a means of defending certain positions. It can be a tactic to cause conditions of disorder or panic. Those who conceive or plan violence as a strategy can be a handful of leaders or organizers of a party or movement. But they rely on a mass of supporters or special groups who do not necessarily need to understand the overall strategy or intended outcome to implement the violence. 28 However, it is necessary that the practitioners or participants in violence are convinced that there would be some benefit to them, directly or indirectly, from engaging in violence. This is where promises of one sort or another are effective as motivators. In most instances, it is promises of material benefit that are most effective. Promises of cash, food, alcohol, jobs, promotion, land, housing, education, amongst others, motivate recruitment into groups, including militia, to carry out violence against designated groups or parties. For youth, in particular, pledges of jobs, money and a better life act as enticement for recruitment into the militia (Interview with N.L., March 2010). Promises of recognition in society or in the party as well as ethnic solidarity also act as baits for recruitment and participation in violence. Explaining Inter-party Violence As we observed in Chapter 1, inter-party violence between ZAPU and ZANU in 1963-64 was an intense and major form of the politics of their rivalry. Significantly, this violence was largely non-state, although the colonial state was an interested party to the extent that it gained advantage from the continued warring between the two nationalist parties. Indeed, one of the nationalist leaders remarked that: ... I do not know how much of the actual violence was afflicted by government agents, but surprisingly well-printed posters began to appear overnight in sensitive areas, abusing me and encouraging the split... (Nkomo, 2001:101). While it would be strange if the colonial state did not seek to profit from the split and subsequent inter-party mayhem, the motivation for the split was competition for political advantage. The calculation amongst ZANU leaders would have been that the colonial state would, sooner or later, be forced to negotiate on independence for the African majority. The prospects of their being in a more favourable position for top leadership positions would improve if they were not under Joshua Nkomo and his loyalists in ZAPU. The use of the ethnic card would not be to the disadvantage of the new party since it modelled itself as a predominantly ‘Shona’ party. It consciously recruited Shona intellectuals such as Hebert Chitepo and Bernard Chidzero, amongst others, to buttress this image. Inter-party violence was basically about creating and extending political space by the two parties so as to build political advantage. To illustrate that inter-party conflict was not...

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