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1 Introduction The post-colonial state of Zimbabwe is in the throes of economic, political and cultural crisis. One of the symptoms of this crisis manifested itself between May and July 2005, when the government launched Operation Murambatsvina, described in official circles as a crackdown by government agents on vendors; innocent men and women doing their business. The crisis of legitimacy characterising the present political leadership has a far longer history than critics have been prepared to concede. The making of Operation Murambatsvina was initially embossed in the British colonial system in Rhodesia. Colonialism’s methods of stripping Africans of their natural and material resources are well documented. Africans guided by the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) fought colonialism until 1980 when Zimbabwe became an independent country under the principle of majority rule, and one person one vote. However, ZANLA and ZIPRA did not ‘provide space for dissenting voices to emerge from within the political movements ’ (Raftopoulos 2004, 1). Political scientist Eldred Masunungure quotes the then Prime Minister of the newly created Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, now President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, addressing the ZANU(PF) Congress held in 1984, saying that during struggle: ‘This exercise [of crushing ZIPA and its Vashandi influence] was followed by a politicisation programme in the camps. We warned any person with a tendency to revolt that the ZANU axe would fall on their necks: Tino tema nedemo [‘We will axe you’] was the clear message (2004:151).’ In 1984, when the prime minister was reported to have said that dissent would be dealt with severely, this message was not merely a metaphor. Between 1981 and 1986, the government sent the Fifth Brigade into parts of Matabeleland and Midlands provinces to pacify those perceived to have been sympathising with dissidents; as many as 20,000 lives were lost. The myth of Zimbabwe in the early 1980s being a successful developmental state overlooks the brutality of Gukurahundi . In the 1990s the government faced massive discontent from workers, Introduction Rethinking Citizen & Subject in Zimbabwe Maurice Taonezvi Vambe 2 MAURICE TAONEZVI VAMBE students and academics who felt that its economic policies were hurting the people. The consistent response of the government was to suppress the critics: tear gas was used against university students and civil society leaders. According to Hammar and Raftopoulos (2003, 10) the watershed came in February 2000, when the government-sponsored constitution was rejected by a majority vote as people resented the ‘unilateral changes made to the final draft by president Mugabe and ZANU(PF) inner circle’ (p. 9). This success of the ‘No’ vote by the majority of Zimbabweans during the 2000 constitutional referendum was the first politically open attempt at questioning ZANU(PF)’s quest for hegemony. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) had been born a year earlier, and made a strong showing in the 2000 parliamentary elections. A battle-line had been drawn and the road to Operation Murambatsvina was mapped out. Raftopoulos (2003, 219) suggests that in order to make up lost ground, ZANU(PF) turned to an ill-conceived land grab, the intimidation of opposition members and arrest of innocent protesters, and presided over the disappearance of political foes: ‘the authoritarianism of the ruling party [was] expressed in the assault on central and local government structures, as a precondition for the re-assertation of ZANU(PF) political dominance’. After winning a controversial1 election in March 2005, the government embarked on Operation Murambatsvina to clean up the country of vendors, flea-market traders and foreign-currency dealers, and to destroy illegally built structures.2 The ferocity of the operation has continued to baffle many. Some say its swiftness was indicative of a government skilled in ruling through ‘operations ’.3 Others say the decision to proceed without exploring dialogue with the people was itself an expression of power inflation4 on the part of the authorities. Some suggest that the authorities are haunted by power daemons and that the government itself has become one.5 And yet others argue that when a govern1 In March 2005 ZANU(PF) won parliamentary elections which were endorsed as free and fair by Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) observers. However, the opposition, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) felt cheated and took the case to the Zimbabwean Court. Although MDC did not win, the political party had registered their dismay over the elections. The European Union (EU) also produced a report in which they...

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