In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Chapter 4 MILITARY INTEGRATION FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE Paul Jackson At the end of the Rhodesian War in 1980, each major faction had a significant military or paramilitary force at its disposal and each leader felt that he would do well in any subsequent election and therefore play a part in developing the new state (Lectuer 1995). However, the history of independent Zimbabwe started with an election victory for Robert Mugabe and his faction, and this faction has systematically destroyed its rivals until, thirty years later, the military and political elite act with virtual impunity. The roots of this power are very much within the integration process and the politicization of the new military, and this case study is one in which an initial integration was systematically undone for political reasons. The case offers a longer-term perspective than many others, and despite problems with some of the available literature, it provides a rich narrative over time, including the development of political power from a base within the security services.1 The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the origins of the military integration process and in particular the characteristics of the different forces involved in the conflict itself. The Rhodesian state was a very specific type of ethnic state, and the conflict protagonists were heavily influenced by ethnic rivalry. However, ethnic tensions among blacks were greatly increased by Mugabe’s party after the war and led to protracted conflict in Matabeleland. The technical military integration itself was relatively straightforward, but the political coloring of the process and the manipulation of security forces had a strong impact on the outcome, undermining security in the eyes of many Zimbabwean citizens. The story is of President Mugabe first isolating and then destroying political rivals in the security services, notably his fellow nationalist Joshua Nkomo, and then proceeding to politicize senior military figures. This was initially done mostly outside the formal military, as opposed to the wartime paramilitary groups, but following the departure of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) in 2000, and with the increased threat of political opposition from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) after the presidential elections of 2000, the militarization of Zimbabwean politics proceeded apace. The history of the integration process shows clearly that Mugabe’s political party (the Zimbabwe African National Union– Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF) and the military have allied to isolate political opposition since the early years of Zimbabwe. EARLY ADOPTERS 50 ORIGINS The war was essentially between the white-dominated government and three competing resistance movements. Both sides drew on outside assistance, and over time the government’s position weakened. The Historic Role of the Military Decolonization led in 1964 to the independence of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia ) and Nyasaland (Malawi), which had previously been part of the Federation of Rhodesia(s) and Nyasaland. However, the white settler regime in Southern Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front Party issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 in order to maintain white rule. This led to the creation by the white minority Rhodesian state of a formidable military regime aimed at destroying African liberation movements that were attempting to bring about black majority rule and full independence from Britain. Allied to the colonial forces of Portuguese East Africa and the apartheid regime of South Africa, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) constructed a military that has become surrounded by something of a mythology regarding successful counterinsurgency (Bairstow 2012). As Bairstow points out, the Rhodesian military have been held up as an example of how to conduct successful counterinsurgency actions, and militarily they were very successful. In addition, the Rhodesian military have been frequently used as a model for contemporary counterinsurgencies (Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold 1991). At the same time, the weight of international opinion was against the white minority, which numbered less than 300,000 (about 5 percent of the population) at its peak, and in favor of the black majority. UDI, despite Rhodesia’s continued desire to be loyal to the British Crown, was viewed as illegal by Britain, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations.2 Against this state machinery were ranged three liberation movements. The two armed nationalist parties favored armed struggle following UDI: Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU).3 The armed wings of these two movements became known, respectively, as the Zimbabwe African National Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Both groups initially hoped to...

Share