In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

C H A P T E R F O U R Cooperation on Marine Research Activities, 2000–2001 TH E S E C O N D I N S T A N C E of Sino-Japanese cooperation over the East China Sea dispute occurred in February 2001, when the two sides exchanged a note verbale promising to notify the other when they undertook marine surveys in disputed waters. Once again, the conflict of interest stemmed from an unresolved dimension of maritime jurisdiction in the East China Sea brought to light by China’s rise as a maritime power. Throughout the middle and late 1990s, Chinese naval and marine research vessels were seen more frequently in Japan’s claimed EEZ. Following a number of diplomatic protests in 1999 and 2000, Tokyo attempted to coerce Chinese cooperation by suspending an official development assistance (ODA) loan in September 2000. The loan was released in October 2000, after Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan agreed in principle to hold talks toward a notification agreement. Unlike the fisheries agreement, the notification agreement failed to curtail Chinese survey activities, however . Tokyo accused Beijing of violating the consensus in July 2001, and this behavior has not subsided. Further, no subsequent diplomatic agreement on the marine survey issue has been negotiated. Viewed through the MVM, the marine research issue is larger than simply a debate about who can do what and where in the East China Sea; it has implications for how Chinese and Japanese vessels of all description will coexist in the waters between the two states. Both parties viewed the legality of marine surveys in the context of the wider strategic implications for their freedom of action in disputed waters. Policymakers in Tokyo viewed Chinese intrusions into its EEZ as a strategic threat to its national security. China valued its survey activities as an economic issue; as a source of important scientific data and intelligence; and as a strategic issue, a source of operational experience for the PLAN. Given the countries’ 9 2 C O O P E R A T I O N O N M A R I N E R E S E A R C H A C T I V I T I E S , 2 0 0 0 – 2 0 0 1 9 3 competing jurisdictional claims to the East China Sea, China was reluctant to curtail or to notify Japan of its activities in contested waters. It thus comes as no surprise that cooperation was pursued coercively by a reactive Japan. Once again, the central policymaking apparatus in Tokyo was pressured from outside actors, particularly the defense establishment, to assert itself on the marine survey issue. Following several failed diplomatic overtures, Japan used ODA pressure to coerce a change in China’s posture in the summer of 2000.1 The depth of cooperation reflects the theoretical expectations derived from these conditions. Given the strategic nature of the issues at hand, there were few rounds of negotiations and it appeared that any agreement would be weak from the outset. The durability of cooperation was limited by two phenomena: a Chinese reluctance to abide by the agreement, and Japan’s inability to attach meaningful costs to deviant Chinese behavior. The Value of Marine Surveys in the East China Sea States are entitled to conduct a variety of research activities on or below ocean waters. These entitlements are complicated by unclear regimes for different kinds of research, which are subject to different laws in different maritime zones, which in turn are interpreted differently by states. This is further complicated by disputed maritime boundaries. The root of the problem in the case of the East China Sea is the increase in Chinese marine research activity combined with its nonrecognition of Japan’s EEZ claim.2 As is illustrated below, Japan’s own domestic and institutional shortcomings prevented a more robust response to this challenge from China. In short, how could Chinese and Japanese authorities enforce their jurisdiction over marine research in an area both claimed as their own? In addition to illegal fishing activities, maritime incidents—such as vessels being boarded or fired upon—have been a feature of Sino-Japanese maritime relations in the early post–Cold War period.3 Following a peak of seventy-two incidents between March 1991 and July 1993, Chinese and Japanese policymakers held talks to reduce the number of maritime incidents with mixed results.4 The Japanese MSA first detected Chinese marine research vessels in Japanese waters...

Share