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CHAPTER 9 FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND NEW TRENDS A wareness of the broader context, history, and motivations underlying the behavior of Islamic confessional parties in Pakistan could vastly improve the ability of foreign policymakers to successfully navigate the ever-changing and often bewildering political terrain there. Oversimplified and uninformed depictions of party politics, and in particular misperceptions of Islamist parties, in Pakistan have affected international policy in negative ways, resulting in clumsy mismanagement or total neglect of potentially vital relationships. Understanding that both pragmatic political and religious considerations motivate Islamic political parties will impact how the US government deals with Islamic political actors, both allies and antagonists. More specifically, understanding that extreme Islamist politics is not driven solely by ideological absolutism should open new opportunities for Western diplomacy. US policy toward Pakistan in the post-9/11 world has focused overwhelmingly on security concerns, particularly in the porous border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This mountainous 1,600-square-mile area on both sides of the border is now the hub of a global militant Islamist insurgency. International stakeholders have become increasingly concerned about the influence of Islamic extremism as these territories have become host to training camps and madrasahs for extremist groups, including the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This region is incredibly difficult to effectively police in part because the political boundaries are purely artificial creations of former colonial powers. In many ways, while they do have socioeconomic differences, the Pashtun peoples of Pakistan share several meaningful features with the Pashtuns in bordering Afghan territories. Movement back and forth between the two areas has long been a normal part of life in the region, reflecting ancient tribal and kinship bonds that remain regardless of the imposition of an arbitrary border. Given these historical realities, while US military action starting in 2001 was originally targeted at Afghanistan, many high-profile targets have migrated into the border regions of Pakistan. Even tacit Pakistani military cooperation with international stakeholders is frowned upon by much of the frontier electorate, in no small part because the Taliban and al-Qaeda are 174 FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND NEW TRENDS 175 able to bring patronage resources to the region and perceived legitimate religious authorities support the insurgents. A much smaller proportion of international aid to Pakistan comes in the form of development support to impoverished regions. The distribution pattern of these funds belies the claim that they are intended to blunt the endemic poverty that is assumed to spur extreme Islamist politics. In reality, funds are given not to the poorest areas but to those of primary security significance, where it is believed that development will lead to security and stability. Development aid in these regions includes funding for health initiatives to improve child and maternal health outcomes and for educational improvements and school-building projects. Money for these efforts has been limited, resulting in modest deliverables and low support from the Pakistani government. Security issues have hampered efforts to provide developmental support, resulting in personnel turnover, project delays, and cessation of projects. Beyond simply sending money, a major role for the foreign policy apparatus is interacting with counterparts in Pakistan to coordinate efforts and promote advantageous policy approaches. In this realm, the actions of Western officials are of particular interest and concern. During President Musharraf’s military rule, the United States largely ignored the country’s civilian opposition, both Islamic and secular, even when they held crucial blocks of power in the National Assembly . This single-minded focus was perhaps inevitable when Pakistan was ruled by martial law and when the United States, above all else, required military support and cooperation during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Since Musharraf’s fall and the rise of civilian parties such as the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz, however, Western officials’ interest of powerful National Assembly concerns is both justified and riskier. The lack of engagement with important groups outside the executive branch is most pronounced in terms of Western dealings with Islamic parties, especially regionally important Islamists. From 2001 to 2007, the Islamist coalition party of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal was a potent political force in Pakistan, but some Western officials not only limited but also avoided contact with its members. The same approach was adopted toward other network and hierarchical Islamist groups with sway in the National Assembly or strategically important districts. Beyond simply refusing to engage these parties, much of the West’s policy directed toward Islamic political parties...

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