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251 From the standpoint of the Air Force fixed-wing gunship fleet, as difficult as the war in Afghanistan proved to be, Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) increased its operations tempo and the stress level on the crews. While they would never complain, nor would they ever shirk their duties or fail at their mission, the demand for their services from 2003 to 2011 remained consistently high and full of pressures not experienced by American fighting personnel since Vietnam, Korea, and World War II. It was the ninth significant military conflict they had been involved in since the Vietnam War.1 With this in mind, it is important to recall how the United States became involved in another war in Iraq. Following the first Persian Gulf War, the United States projected a policy of containment towards Iraq, complete with economic sanctions, UN oversight of arms and military matters in Iraq, and enforcement of no-fly zones in both northern and southern regions of Iraq. Throughout the 1990s Saddam Hussein tested the limits of US patience by periodically refusing to allow weapons inspectors to inspect his weapons development labs. Up to early 2003, Hussein would turn inspectors away defiantly, only to back down after threats of intervention by US and UN officials. Simultaneously , he would also test the limits of the northern nofly zone designed to protect the Kurds and the no-fly zone in the south designed to protect the Shia minority. Not only did this infuriate Americans, but it concerned them because there seemed to be evidence that Hussein was directing his scientists and technical experts to develop WMDs such as gas, nuclear, and biological weapons that might be delivered by missiles or aircraft as terror weapons, killing masses of people in major population centers from Tel Aviv to Mecca.2 15 Operation Iraqi Freedom 252 | CHAPTER 15 In October 1998 the US Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, designed specifically to encourage the people of Iraq to topple the existing regime of Saddam Hussein. Provisions of part of the act provided $97 million for Iraqi “democratic opposition organizations” to “establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.”3 In the meantime, the UN Security Council was primarily concerned with the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 687, which aimed at stopping Iraqi weapons development programs to prevent any potential terror attack on a global scale. In support of this aspect of UN policy, in November 1998 American and British planes initiated an aerial bombardment campaign designated Operation Desert Fox, specifically aimed at destroying Iraq’s ability to make chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.4 During the Clinton years, the United States sought to avoid another conflict with the Iraqis, mainly because we did not see the value of such a conflict in terms of the expenditure of money and lives it might cost. Besides, Hussein, as evil as he was, provided a nonsectarian buffer to the radical Muslims in Iran. This policy changed with the election of George W. Bush in 2000. Instead of a diplomatic solution, his administration, even before 9/11, began planning for an invasion of Iraq and a “regime change.” His party’s platform had called for “full” application of the Iraq Liberation Act, and Bush’s key advisors, specifically Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had long advocated finishing the job begun in 1991. It is revealing that former Bush secretary of the treasury Paul O’Neill, after leaving the administration, made convincing claims that the attack on Iraq had been planned since the inauguration and that Bush’s very first NSC meeting involved a detailed discussion of just such an invasion scenario. As O’Neill told interviewer Leslie Stahl in a 60 Minutes report, “From the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go. . . . Going after Saddam was topic “A” 10 days after the inauguration—eight months before Sept. 11.” In fairness, it is equally clear that this issue was also a continuation of a policy being considered by the Clinton NSC. Still, Bush’s more aggressive policy toward Iraq facilitated a move toward invasion.5 These seeds began to sprout soon after the attacks on September 11, 2001. The very day that terrorists attacked the WTC and the Pentagon, Rumsfeld asked his aides for information on whether it was possible to take down Hussein concurrently with Osama bin Laden. This...

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