A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos

Chapter 3: The Plan

36 CHAPTER THREE The Plan As the initial concept for the operation was being developed and briefed, Lieutenant General Sutherland was at first told, because of operational security concerns, not to discuss the plan with his South Vietnamese counterpart, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, commander of ARVN I Corps. However, Sutherland soon learned that Lam already knew about the upcoming operation. On 22 December 1970, the US advisor to the 1st ARVN Division, Col. Ben Harrison, discovered that Lam and Brig. Gen. Pham Van Phu, commander of the 1st ARVN Division, had already discussed a possible operation in Laos. Phu then asked Harrison and his staff to provide assistance in drafting a division plan for the crossborder operation. When Harrison contacted Sutherland for guidance , Sutherland, following Abrams’s orders, denied permission for Harrison to assist the ARVN in the planning for the operation.1 Therefore, both corps commanders were independently preparing plans for the operation that one would conduct and the other would support. This surreal situation continued until the first week in January. On 7 January, Admiral Moorer sent Abrams a message authorizing him to finalize planning for the Laotian operation. That same day, General Abrams sent Lieutenant General Sutherland a message instructing him to prepare a detailed plan for the attack into Laos. The deadline for submission of the final plan was no later than 16 January, giving Sutherland and his planners just nine days to complete the planning cycle. Subsequently, Sutherland, finally given approval to coordinate with his counterpart, met with Lam to discuss how to proceed. A combined planning cell was established, and as General Sutherland later observed, “the tempo of planning increased and with it more personnel were added to the combined planning staff.” Sutherland offered the XXIV Corps headquarters as a secure area for the planning, and the two corps commanders agreed to assign The Plan 37 two members of their respective staffs to form the combined planning cell. The planners were instructed to be prepared to brief the completed plan on 16 January 1971.2 On 21 January, Sutherland and Lam flew to Saigon, where they met with Generals Vien and Abrams at MACV headquarters. There they presented a detailed briefing of the plan. Later that day, Lam briefed the plan to President Thieu. Operation Lam Son 719, named for the birthplace of Le Loi, a Vietnamese national hero who had defeated an invading Chinese army in the early fifteenth century, was to be a combined RVNAF-US operation conducted under several constraints.3 No joint command headquarters was established for the control of the operation. As previously stated, the overall ground commander of the operation in Laos was to be Lieutenant General Lam, who would respond directly to orders and guidance from President Thieu; ultimately, this relationship would govern the complete course of the operation, reducing US control and influence once the South Vietnamese forces crossed into Laos. General Sutherland would command all involved US Army forces and coordinate American support in Military Region I for the operation; as part of that effort, he also would coordinate and direct all airmobile operations in support of General Lam’s ground plans in both South Vietnam and Laos. Gen. Lucius D. Clay Jr., commander of the Seventh Air Force, would command and coordinate all US Air Force resources that would support the operation. Lam and Sutherland would control their respective phases of the operation from forward command posts at Dong Ha and Quang Tri, respectively; I Corps would establish a forward command post at FSB Kilo, just south of Khe Sanh. Because of the congressional restrictions against US ground personnel crossing the border, the ground action in Laos would be the sole responsibility of South Vietnamese forces; as previously stated, there would be no US ground combat troops in Laos, and American advisers with the ARVN units would remain in South Vietnam. This would have a major impact on normal operating procedures, particularly with regard to fire support coordination. The South Vietnamese had grown dependent on their advisers to help coordinate fires, tactical air support, and logistics; in Laos they would have to accomplish these critical functions themselves. The operation was envisioned to be a spoiling attack, one that Chapter 3 38 was designed not so much to take and hold terrain objectives, but rather to strike at the enemy’s lines of communication in Laos, disrupt his plans, and...