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178 CHAPTER ELEVEN Aftermath Despite the internal negative assessments and lingering concerns about Operation Lam Son 719, the Nixon administration continued to attempt to put the best face on it publicly. Even Henry Kissinger joined in the effort. In a report to Carl Albert, speaker of the House, Kissinger said that the North Vietnamese would have fewer options in 1972 because of the impact of the operation . He concluded, “The combination of enemy manpower and logistics setbacks resulting from the Lam Son operation make it unlikely that the enemy will mount major offensive activities in South Vietnam or in Cambodia, despite evidence that the enemy planned to mount such offensives.”1 As it turned out, Kissinger could not have been more wrong. The months after Lam Son 719 proved to be only the calm before the gathering of a new storm. Immediately following the termination of Lam Son 719, General Abrams instituted new programs in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses and correct the deficiencies of the ARVN that had been so apparent during the operation. In Laos, the North Vietnamese had clearly demonstrated that they had turned away from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare, which the South Vietnamese forces had great difficulty in trying to counter. The only way to combat this type of warfare was with combined arms operations that focused on the synchronization of infantry , armor, artillery, and air support. Abrams urged General Vien to appoint a committee to develop a combined arms doctrine suitable for RVNAF use; this was done, and the committee produced the Combined Arms Doctrinal Manual, which was approved late in 1971.2 Additionally, command post exercises for ARVN units were initiated to teach air-ground coordination and combined tankinfantry operations. General Abrams directed his corps senior advisers to put together mobile advisory and support groups to work directly with the South Vietnamese corps commanders to Aftermath 179 provide “dynamic support to the early introduction of the new mode of [combined arms] tactics” within the RVNAF. He also directed that a joint support group be established in each ARVN corps area command patterned on the one XXIV Corps had established during Lam Son 719. The purpose of these groups was to help improve the coordination of US air and artillery support to South Vietnamese corps and division staffs, particularly with regard to the employment of B-52s, helicopter gunships, and artillery fire. Later, Abrams assigned an additional senior Army officer as “air-mobile adviser” in each corps zone to help coordinate US helicopter support to South Vietnamese field units.3 MACV also took steps to improve RVNAF weaponry. The T-54 tanks and heavy artillery that the NVA used in Laos outmatched the ARVN M41 tanks and the lighter South Vietnamese artillery . In an attempt to counter the heavier communist weapons, MACV equipped one South Vietnamese tank battalion in Military Region I with the US M48 main battle tank, which was much more capable than the M41. Additionally, one ARVN artillery battalion received 175-mm self-propelled guns to combat the Soviet 130-mm long-range guns that the NVA possessed. Those new weapons were steps in the right direction, but the amounts provided were in such small numbers as to have little significant impact . As General Davidson, former MACV J2, wrote after the war, these efforts would eventually prove to be part of the continual story of “too little, too late.”4 Modern equipment for the ARVN was not the most important consideration in improving the fighting ability of the South Vietnamese forces. General Abrams noted in July 1971 that poor leadership remained the most critical South Vietnamese weakness .5 This had only been too apparent during Lam Son 719. Abrams and his senior generals began a campaign to convince Thieu to replace weaker leaders at the top of the ARVN chain of command. Although the South Vietnamese president made a few changes, the criteria for senior command in the ARVN remained political loyalty rather than proven combat ability. A 1971 assessment of the RVNAF officer corps noted that the army had not been able to divorce itself from politics and that family relationships , personal loyalties, and regional, school, and business ties determined entrée into the upper levels of the officer corps.6 Even senior South Vietnamese generals realized that something had to be done. General Vien wrote after the war that “the [3.146.34.191] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 15:47 GMT...

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