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52 On 21 January, Lieutenant General Sutherland briefed the detailed XXIV Corps/I Corps plan to General Abrams and the Joint General Staff. Abrams subsequently approved the plan. In a follow -on meeting later that day, General Lam briefed the plan to President Thieu. Shortly thereafter, MACV dispatched a briefing team to CINCPAC and JCS to secure final approval. It was believed that communist espionage cells were active within the RVNAF high command; therefore, General Abrams directed that the number of personnel involved in joint planning for the operation be held to a bare minimum.1 Even General Lam’s chief of operations, Col. Cao Khee Nhat, was not permitted to attend the plans briefing at XXIV Corps headquarters despite the fact that he had helped write the plan being discussed.2 D-Day was set for 30 January. South Vietnamese forces would cross the border into Laos on 8 February. Due to continuing concerns with security, I Corps did not disseminate its orders to subordinate commanders until 2 February; this delayed coordination among participating units while doing little to conceal friendly intentions from the enemy.3 The Airborne Division was to be the main effort, but the division commander, Lt. Gen. Du Quoc Dong, was not informed of the role his division would play until 18 January. He and his division did not begin detailed planning until they received the corps order on 2 February, giving them less than a week before they were to cross the line of departure. General Dong assigned the 3rd Airborne Brigade (consisting of the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Battalions) to occupy Objectives 30, 31, and A Luoi. Meanwhile, the armor-infantry task force consisting of the 1st Airborne Brigade (1st, 8th, and 9th Battalions), 1st Armored Brigade (11th and 17th Squadrons), 44th Artillery Battalion (155-mm towed), and the 101st Engineer Battalion would advance westward along Route 9, repairing the road as it adCHAPTER FOUR The Mission Receives a Green Light The Mission Receives a Green Light 53 vanced to link up with the airborne forces in A Luoi. The 2nd Airborne Brigade (5th, 7th, and 11th Battalions) would then seize Tchepone to link up with the armor-infantry column that would continue along Route 9 to Tchepone. Lieutenant General Lam approved the Airborne Division plan on 3 February. In an attempt to preclude premature press coverage of the operation , the decision was made at MACV to impose an embargo on reporting troop movements until the operation was actually launched. This would prove to be an unwise move, because the imposition of the embargo was itself an indication of an upcoming operation and served to alienate the press, who would quickly become aware of the preparations being made for the coming offensive. Despite the difficulties with maintaining secrecy about the operation , US and ARVN commanders were very optimistic about the potential outcome of the ambitious plan. Col. Arthur W. Pence, the senior adviser to the ARVN Airborne Division, reported after the operation: “It was apparent at this time that . . . Intelligence felt the operation would be lightly opposed and that a twoday preparation of the area prior to D-Day by tactical air would effectively neutralize the enemy antiaircraft capability, although the enemy was credited with having 170 to 200 antiaircraft weapons of mixed caliber in the operational area. The tank threat was considered minimal, and the reinforcement capability was listed as fourteen days for two divisions from north of the DMZ.”4 Still, General Abrams was under no illusions that the operation would be easy, believing that the North Vietnamese had a significant fighting force in the area of operations and could “be expected to defend his base areas and logistics against any allied operation.”5 Radio intercepts beginning on 24 January reflected the enemy’s concern over anticipated US and ARVN operations in northern Military Region I and the contiguous areas of Laos; they would not be caught unaware by the coming thrust into Laos.6 Nevertheless, both US and ARVN commanders and planners appear to have been emboldened by the modest success of the earlier Cambodian incursion in 1970. However, three significant differences between the attack into Laos and the Cambodian incursion exerted major influence on the ultimate outcome of Lam Son 719. Lam Son was to be a combined operation, but although US XXIV Corps would provide logistical support, long-range artillery , and helicopters, US personnel, unlike in the Cambodian [3.15.156...

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