Change and Conflict in the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps since 1945

7. Ministering on the Battlefield

7 Ministering on the Battlefield In the latter part of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century, chaplains’ role as “the conscience of the Army” expanded beyond the teaching of ethics and moral leadership in the service schools to advising and assisting commanders in meeting the challenges and requirements of the combat environment. In the process, chaplains continued or expanded traditional roles and developed new ones. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, chaplains’ battlefield ministry reflected both continuity and change. The New Combat Environment In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Army leaders began preparing for future wars by developing what became known as the AirLand Battle doctrine. Military strategists envisioned both nuclear and conventional war in Europe, as well as high- and low-intensity engagements in other parts of the world. The immediate concern was the possibility of a conventional war between NATO and the Soviet Union.1 Chaplain field manuals presented graphic descriptions of the AirLand combat environment and its devastating effect on the soldiers fighting in it. The 1984 manual described the battlefield as “characterized by high mobility, lethality, and intense around-the-clock combat lasting several days at a time.” It observed that “Soviet doctrine emphasizes striking at every echelon simultaneously.” It also noted the “high probability of NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] employment early in the battle.” The “wide dispersion of troops” produced by large taskforce areas of operation would result in “isolation—one of the greatest enemies of soldiers in combat.” The manual predicted that “casualty rates, chaos, shock, and confusion will be greater than any this country has ever experienced.” It warned that “only well-trained soldiers with high reserves of emotional, physical, and spiritual stamina will be able to function effectively in this environment.”2 124 Ministering on the Battlefield The 1989 chaplain field manual recognized the different strategic environment that had developed by the late 1980s. It predicted that “low-intensity­conflicts” (including those that are terrorist inspired) would be “the predominant type of conflict in the near future, with the constant potential for escalation to mid-intensity conflict.” It also took note of the threat posed by the “extreme religious and political beliefs” that prompted terrorist activity. In addition to warning of adversaries’ use of chemical and/or nuclear weapons, it anticipated “artillery bombardment in the division area of operation and missile and air strikes as far back as the theater rear area.”3 The collapse of the Soviet Union produced an even more dramatic change in the “threat environment.” The 1995 and 2003 chaplain manuals pointed out that U.S. forces now faced “many and varied . . . potential threats,” ranging from “a local populace with small arms to a conventional force possessing weapons of mass destruction.” Religious or ethnic conflict would continue to produce regional instability. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) would generally focus on “stability” and “support” operations, but they might also involve offensive or defensive operations and adversaries’ use of chemical or nuclear weapons. Manuals of the twenty-first century continued to emphasize the “lethality and intensity” of the combat environment and the “shock, fatigue, isolation, fear, and death” soldiers would undoubtedly experience.4 In such circumstances, the religious support chaplains provided became extremely important—to the military operation as well as to soldiers. Developing a “Battle-Focused Ministry” When the Vietnam War ended, the army chaplaincy adapted to a peacetime role, focusing on religious support for personnel and family members on army installations . In the early 1980s, in response to changes in international relations and the development of AirLand Battle doctrine, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains turned its attention to formulating Chaplain Corps doctrine for a new, “battlefocused ministry” in the combat environment.5 The chaplain field manuals of the 1980s and later decades continued the longstanding regulation defining chaplains as noncombatants and stating that they “will not bear arms” and were not to receive training in their use. They presented the traditional rationale, pointing out that under the Geneva and Hague Conventions, chaplains have “protected status” and, when detained, are not con- 125 Ministering on the Battlefield sidered prisoners of war. “Violation of this non-combatant principle by a chaplain would endanger the protected status of all chaplains captured by the enemy,” the 1984 manual observed.6 Two new doctrines were Forward Thrust, approved in 1980, and the Unit Ministry Team (UMT...