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United States v. Rhodes
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United States v. Rhodes Circuit Court, D. Kentucky 1866 27 Fed. Cas. 785, Case #16,151 Associate Justice Noah H. Swayne in this federal Circuit Court decision provided perhaps the first judicial interpretation of the 1866 Civil Rights Act enacted by Congress, over the veto of President Andrew Johnson, to enforce the 1865 Thirteenth Amendment . Section two of the Thirteenth Amendment states, “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation,” the first enforcement clause attached to a constitutional amendment in the nation’s history. But, could Congress confer “rights” on persons in their localities, a responsibility that had previously been the domain of the locality or (at most) the states prior to the Civil War? Did the Thirteenth Amendment achieve nothing more than the constitutional end of slavery; or, could Congress, not the localities or the states, then move forward and guarantee the rights of those persons recently emancipated? No one knew, but this decision, heard on circuit, involved a dispute that arose out of Nelson County, Kentucky. Kentucky had a long-standing judicial rule that blacks could not testify against whites. Swayne’s opinion demonstrated the potential reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, began the judicial consideration of the thorny issue of the meaning of “citizen,” tested the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and suggests just how revolutionary the Thirteenth Amendment might have been. Swayne held that “We entertain no doubt of the constitutionality of the act in all its provisions.” In time, other statutes and amendments overshadowed the Thirteenth Amendment and this decision, especially the crucial 1868 Fourteenth Amendment, which built on the Thirteenth, the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and this decision. Rhodes suggests a path not taken in judicial interpretation. Documentary History of the American Civil War Era 516 Motion in arrest of judgment. An indictment for burglary in entering the house of T., in Kentucky, averred that T. was of African descent, and a citizen; that she was, by the laws of Kentucky , denied the right to testify against the defendants, they being white. There was a public statute of Kentucky enabling white persons, under similar circumstances , to testify. Held, that the indictment was sufficient, and that the circuit court might take jurisdiction, under section 3 of the act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 28 U.S.C.A. § § 41(14), 74, 75, 79, 729, known as the “Civil Rights Bill,” notwithstanding there was no averment of the statute of Kentucky. The circuit court should take judicial notice of such statute, and the indictment should be construed in the same manner as if the statute were averred. swayne, Circuit Justice. This is a prosecution under the act of congress of the 9th of April, 1866 [14 Stat. 27], entitled “An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means for their vindication.” The defendants having been found guilty by a jury, the case is now before us upon a motion in arrest of judgment. Three grounds are relied upon in support of the motion. It is insisted: I. That the indictment is fatally defective. II. That the case which it makes, or was intended to make, is not within the act of congress upon which it is founded. III. That the act itself is unconstitutional and void. I. As to the indictment, if either count be sufficient, it will support the judgment of the court upon the verdict. Our attention will be confined to the second count. That count alleges that the defendants, being white persons, “on the 1st of May, 1866, at the county of Nelson, in the state and district of Kentucky, at the hour of eleven of the clock in the night of the same day, feloniously and burglariously did break and enter the dwelling house there situate of Nancy Talbot, a citizen of the United States of the African race, having been born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, who was then and there, and is now, denied the right to testify against the said defendants, in the courts of the state of Kentucky, and of the said county of Nelson, with intent the goods and chattels, moneys and property of the said Nancy Talbot, in the said dwelling house then and there being, feloniously and burglariously to steal, take, and carry away, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United...