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T W O Van Darn's Folly: The Battle of Corinth In his early forties, the brash Earl Van Dorn cut a fine figure astride his horse. The epitome of the mythical southern cavalier,VanDorn, a West Point graduate in the same class as William Rosecrans, loved the army life, sought danger, dreamed big, and, all in all, was in many respects the western counterpart to a Virginia cavalryman namedJ. E. B. Stuart. Appointed major general in September 1861, Van Dorn seemed to have a promising career ahead of him in the Confederate army. But on the campaign trail, that promise dimmed at the Battle of Pea Ridge on April 7-8, 1862. During this fight in the northwestern corner of Arkansas,Van Dorn demonstrated all the weaknesses that made him an inept commander of a large army. His plans were too ambitious for the resources he had available. He intended to win in Arkansas, and then march as a conquering hero into Missouri, claiming that state for the Confederacy.Such grandiose ideas based on unrealistic means made VanDorn a reckless battlefield commander . He demanded considerably more from his troops than theywere able to deliver. Not that he had mediocre soldiers; indeed, some of the Confederacy's best fighters, especiallyMissourians, served under Van Dorn at Pea Ridge. They won the first day's fight, but Van Dorn crippled the second day's effort by ignoring some basic factors. His ordnance train was not where it should have been; his men were worn out and suffering from the bitter cold; his plan of attack, The Battle of Corinth 25 Earl Van Dorn. Confederate general defeated at Corinth. Credit: EzraJ. Warner, Generals in Gray, Baton Rouge: LSUPress though well designed, had been poorly coordinated, and therefore his armywasnot in the position he had hoped it would be in; and his Union foes were still very capable and in a strong defensive position. Despite these problems, Van Dorn ordered an assault and was soon leading his defeated army eastward. Van Dorn's performance during the forthcoming Corinth campaign would offer proof of another of his shortcomings—that he learned very little from his mistakes. Van Dorn had redeemed himself somewhat at Vicksburg. He had arrived in Mississippi with his Arkansas army too late to fight at Shiloh, so he had wound up in Vicksburg, where he took more credit than he deserved for keeping Union gunboats at bay during the summer of 1862. The gunboat threat had ended, the Baton Rouge campaign had concluded with mixed results, and nowVan Dorn looked to Corinth for his next great adventure. In fact, he had visions of clearing west Tennessee of the enemy, a difficult if not impossible task given his resources. But that had not stopped him at Pea Ridge, and it would not stop him now. Sterling Price's army had stopped for a rest at Baldwyn after its re- [3.16.81.94] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 02:23 GMT) 24 luka and Corinth treat from luka. On September 28, Price's men finallyjoined upwith Van Dorn and his force from Vicksburgat the town of Ripley, southwest of Corinth. Revealingthe nature of his strategic goal, VanDorn named the combined forces the Army of West Tennessee. The army included Price's divisions under Louis Hebert and Dabney Maury and another division commanded by Major General Mansfield Lovell, who had been scathed in the southern press for giving up New Orleans without much of a fight earlier in the year. Twocavalry brigades led by Frank Armstrong and William H. Jackson rounded out the armyof twenty-two thousand. On paper, and in fact, thiswas a veteran, tough armycapable ofwinning if given proper leadership. As at Pea Ridge, Van Dorn's campaign plan was excellent, but it ignored some factors that would doom his vision of great victory. In his postcampaign report, Van Dorn acknowledged that scouting information indicated a total Union force of over forty thousand in the west Tennessee-north Mississippiarea. But these troops were widely scattered, and Corinth, geographically anyway, was isolated from the rest of the Union detachments. So Van Dorn thought he could hit Corinth, conquer the army under William Rosecrans there, and then, with control of the railroad junction, continue his campaign to rid west Tennessee of Yankee troops. AsVan Dorn said, "It was clear to my mind that if a successful attack could be made upon Corinth from the west and northwest, the forces there driven back on the...

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