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112 Chapter 5 Deepening Globalization and the Unmaking of the Postcolonial Order, 1990–1997 Global Change, Adjustment, and the Political Economy of Bananas A series of global shifts in the 1990s signaled the “emergence of a new world order characterized by the globalization of production and consumption, [and] the liberalization and regionalization of the rule of economic law” (Nurse 1995, 2–3). These changes held far-reaching implications for the St. Lucia banana industry , leading to a process of adjustment that made the question of globalization , in a very direct sense, a “localized” issue for St. Lucians (Slocum 1996). The adjustments included privatization of the St. Lucia Banana Growers Association, the purchase by the Windward Islands governments of Geest Industries’ banana interests in the United Kingdom, and the increased fragmentation of the banana industry structure through privatization, which replaced co-operative production with private competition. The common feature of these developments was the reduction in the level of control of small producers over the industry as a result of the growing influence of “commercial considerations” in running the industry. Developments from 1992 onward saw the steady erosion of the guarantees given to Caribbean fruit under the first Lomé Convention of 1975. A special protocol under this treaty had guaranteed that “in respect of its banana exports to the Community markets, no African, Caribbean, and Pacific [ACP] state shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages on these markets in a less favourable position than in the past or present” (CBEA 1994, 1). This guarantee was a consistent feature of the first three Lomé conven- Deepening Globalization, Unmaking Postcolonial Order, 1990–1997 113 tions, while in the fourth it was qualified by the assertion of the right of the European Community (EC) to establish a common regime for bananas. This assertion clearly indicates the manner in which the external economy had provided a context in which the internal economic project of the independent state could be sustained. Indeed, Lomé had shaped much of the economic fabric of the St. Lucia banana industry and, by extension, much of its wider political economy. The first blow to the St. Lucia banana industry was struck by the introduction of a new European Union (EU) banana import regime (NBR) in 1993 as a consequence of the formation of the Single European Market (SEM). The main implication of the NBR was the increased access to the U.K. market for lower-cost “dollar bananas” from Latin America (GOSL Strategy Paper 1999, 7). Indeed, well before the SEM had come into effect, Latin American producers had begun to increase banana exports to Europe to corner the opening European market. Between 1988 and 1992 banana shipments to Europe from the “big three” Latin American multinational banana producers—Chiquita, Del Monte, and Dole—increased by 46 percent (Grossman 1998, 53). The NBR, however, contained a number of features beneficial to Caribbean producers. First, it continued to offer a measure of protection for Caribbean bananas through the application of tariff quotas to non-EU/ACP banana suppliers (Nurse 1995, 2).1 Relatedly, ACP producers were allowed duty-free quotas, which in the case of St. Lucia amounted to 127,000 tonnes (GOSL Strategy Paper 1999, 7). Another beneficial feature of the NBR was the allocation of 30 percent of dollar licenses to importers of ACP and EU fruit. This allowed the Windward Islands to register as official importers of their bananas and to exploit a useful source of revenue. It also gave the Windward Islands increased leverage in relation to Geest Industries since “that Company now depended on shipping Windwards fruit to gain access to profitable dollar licenses” (Grossman 1998, 55). However, the continued process of globalization of world trade brought these special arrangements under attack. One of the earliest challenges to the NBR of 1993 came from within the EU itself from states such as Germany, which had little historical attachment to ACP states. This reality led to the fear that the fate of the Caribbean region would be decided by “those EC member governments with more interest in resolving global trade issues than in the special relationships enshrined in the Lomé Convention” (Caribbean Insight, November 1992, 4). Compton (Budget Address 1993, 3) echoed this fear in the St. Lucia House of Assembly: “As far as St. Lucia is concerned, our trading relationships are no longer determined by our former ties with the United Kingdom which, for historical reasons, we could influence, but rather...

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