The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy: In Two Volumes

Introduction

299 The Principles of Moral Philosophy u part ii u Introduction In the former part of this enquiry, we have proved from the direct consideration of our frame and constitution, that it is good; or that we are made for an excellent end. But because this subject is of the last importance , it is well worth while to consider the objections which are made against human nature, and the present state of mankind. Now before I examine particular objections, it is proper to premise in general, I. That objections which necessarily terminate in demanding impossibilities , are absurd. And such are all those which imply in them as direct a contradiction, as if it were demanded that man should be, and not be, at the same time. II. Such objections are likewise absurd which demand any alteration to the worse; or a change from which greater inconveniencieswouldnecessarily follow than those complained of. For a more inconvenient law would certainly be a worse one. It is necessary to premise these two plain truths in an Essay, wherein it is proposed to shew, that the objections brought against our present state, do, if not at first sight, yet when closely pursued to their ultimate meaning and tendency, terminate either in demanding an impossibility, or a change to the worse. But they are also premised, because a great many imperfections and evils in the world, are resolved by some ancient philosophers into what they call inhability or obliquity of the subject, and necessity of nature. By which I am apt to think, they meantimperfections and evils which are, in the nature of things, absolutelyunavoidableupon How it is proposed to answer objections. Objections which end either in demanding an impossibility, or a change to the worse are absurd. What the ancients meant by the inhability or obliquity of a subject. 300 part ii the supposition of the existence of certain subjects, as being absolutely inseparable from them. And, without all doubt, the objections which terminate in demanding some law or property in a material being; for instance, which it cannot in the nature of things admit of, are absurd for that very reason, if there is a moral fitness, that there should be a material creation. I give this example,a because those philosophers had recourse to the inhability or obliquity of the subject, and the necessity of nature chiefly in accounting for apparent evils of the physical kind, that is, apparent evils resulting from the properties of matter, and the laws of corporeal motion. But we may justly call inhabilityof thesubject and necessity of nature, all natural or essential incapacity in any subject, moral or material of any demanded per-fection. For certainly all such appearances are sufficiently vindicated, which are shewn to be the necessary result of the essential qualities of a subject, natural or moral; orall such objectionsaresufficientlyrefuted,whichareshewntodemand something incompatible with the essential properties of a subject, provided it can be proved to be morally fit and good that such a subject should exist. Thus all objections against the material creation, which necessarily terminate in demanding that matter should be active and not passive, are certainly absurd. If it be morally fit that matter should exist: since matter is essentially, or as matter, passive and inert. In like manner, all objections against a moral creature, which necessarily terminate in demanding impeccability in such creature; or a physical impossibility of its forming any wrong judgment, or chusing unreasonably, must be absurd , if it be morally fit and good that such a moral creatureshouldexist; since impeccability or absolute impossibility of erring is incompatible with the moral powers and properties which constitute a moral creature. All such demands terminate in an absurdity, because they require what the subject cannot admit of; what is contrary to its nature, that is, what is really impossible and contradictory. a. Plutarch de procreatione animae. [Plutarch, De procreatione animae. Possibly a reference to passages at 1014D–E, 1015A, 1026D–E, or 1027A. Plutarch, Omnia quae extant opera, 2 vols. (Paris, 1624).] introduction to part ii 301 Now inhability of a subject, or necessity of nature, as we have explained it, supposes no limitation of creating, unless the impossibility of working contradictions; as for instance, of making a thing to be and not to be at the same time, or of making the same subject possess at the same time repugnant and incompatible qualities, be...