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174 u c h a p t e r v u Let us therefore enquire into the laws of our nature, relative to utility or interest, to private and publick good; the natural end and happiness of every man in particular, and of society or our kind in general. One of the best modern writers on morals has given us a veryaccurate division of the chief questionsrelativetomorality.a “Thefirstis,toknow (says he) whether there are not some actions or affections which obtain the approbation of any spectator or observer, and others which move his dislike and condemnation. Now this question, as every man can answer for himself, so universal experience and history shew that in all nations it is so; and consequently the moral sense is universal. 2. Whether there be any particular quality, which, whenever it is perceived , gains approbation, and the contrary raises disapprobation?Now we shall find this quality to be kind affection or study of the public good of others. And thus the moral senses of men are generally uniform. About these two questions there is little reasoning: we know how to answer them by reflecting on our own sentiments, or by consulting others. 3. But what actions do really evidence kind affections, or do really tend to the greatest public good? About this question is all the special reasoning of those who treat of particular laws of nature, or even civil laws. This is the largest field, and the most useful subject of reasoning, which remains upon every scheme of morals. 4. What are the motives, which even from self-love, would excite each individual to do those actions which are particularly useful. Now it is probable, indeed, no man would approve as virtuous, an action publickly useful, to which the agent was only excited by self-love, without any kind affection: it is also probable, a. See Hutcheson on the passions. [Hutcheson, Passions, II.iv.] Another class of laws. Those relative to interest or private and public good. The several enquiries about morals classed. chapter v 175 that no view of interest can raise that kind affection which we approve as virtuous; nor can any reasoning do it, except that which shews some moral goodness, or kind affections in the objects; for this never fails, when it is observed or supposed in any person to raise the love of the observer; so that virtue cannot be taught. Yet since all men havenaturally self-love, as well as kind affections, the former may often counteract the latter, or the latter the former: in each case, the agent is in some degree uneasy and unhappy. The first rash views of human affairs often represent private interest as opposite to the public: when it is apprehended self-love may often engage men in public hurtful actions, which their moral sense will condemn, and this is the ordinary course of vice. To represent these motives of self-interest to engage men to publickly useful actions, is therefore the most necessary point in morals.”Nowthis is what I proceed to consider, in order to shew that by the laws of our nature, what the moral sense approves or virtue is private, as well as public good; and what the moral sense disapproves or vice is private as well as public ill. I. And first of all I would observe, that there is no philosophical subject which affords more pleasure to the mind, than the consideration of the strict union and connexion between beauty and utility prevailing throughout nature,a as far as we are able to pry into it; and which therea . This observation is taken from Cicero. See it explained by him at great length, de oratore, Lib. 3. No. 45. Edit. Schrevel. Sed ut in plerisque rebus incredibiliter hoc natura est ipsa fabricata: sic in oratione; ut ea quae maximam utilitatem in se continerent eadem haberent plurimum vel dignitatis, vel saepe etiam venustatis. Incolumitatis ac salutis, omnium causa videmus hunc statum esse totius mundi atque naturae —Referte nunc animum ad hominum vel etiam caeterorum animantium formam & figuram—linquamus naturam artesque videamus, &c. Compare this passage with what he says, Orat. ad Marc. Brutum, No. 22, 23, 24, 25. [Cicero,Deoratore, III.xlv.178–xlvi.180: “But in oratory as in most matters nature has contrived with incredible skill that the things possessing most utility also have the greatest amount of dignity, and indeed frequently of beauty also. We observe that for the safety and security of...

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