Essays on Church, State, and Politics

Chapter VI

u chapter vi u On the Duties of Those Living in a Commonwealth§1. It would be easy to discuss the duties of those living in a commonwealth if there had not been such difficulties concerning the theory of such a civil society, without which these duties are discussed in vain. The reasons for these difficulties are the excessive adoration of the sayings of Aristotle, or rather of the sayings of his interpreters who have not properly understood him, as well as the eagerness to use arguments from everywhere to contradict those people who are believed to err; another reason is the explanation of passages from Scripture contrary to the rules of good interpretation and precepts of logic; and finally the idle, curious speculations of humans, who explore the state of innocence so thoroughly that they end up attributing I know not what kinds of societies to it, just because it seems nice to do so.§2. We have shown in the first book that there were not going to be any commonwealths and civil societies in that state of perfection.91 Hence I consider it a rhetorical trick that is suitable only for persuading the vulgar if someone claims that since the political community is the most perfect society it could not have been unbecoming to the most perfect state of humanity.92 91. See Institutes, bk. I, chap. ii, §37. 92. Thomasius has his orthodox Lutheran opponent Valentin Alberti in mind. 480 book iii 481§3. For we have already discussed this doctrine of the Peripatetics concerning the political community as the most perfect human society, and I would surely offer the same reply to this frivolity as other people would if I argued that the most perfectly constructed buildings, most refined fare, most precious garments, and most wholesome medicines could not have been unbecoming to this state [of innocence].§4. Let us see whether I can argue with the Peripatetics from common ground. We agree that the purpose of the political community is twofold. The principal and final end is eÈdaimon¤a, that is, true civil happiness, not for one person, but for the entire people. The other, subordinate purpose is aÈtãrkeia, that is, the sufficiency of all external things and goods. I have already observed above that the legitimate measures to protect against violence pertain to happiness rather than sufficiency, since it is impossible to conceive of civil happiness without peace and common tranquillity.93§5. We also agree in saying that the form of the political community is the commonwealth, that is, a relationship between those who command and those who obey, and between the supreme ruler and inferior magistrates.§6. Hence, it seems that the definition of a political community flows automatically from its form and purpose. The political community is a natural society with a supreme power of command, for the sake of suf- ficiency and civil happiness.§7. For we do not deny that the political community is a natural society, nor do we accuse Aristotle of being absurd when he said that man was by nature a political animal. But from this does not follow what the Aristotelian interpreters have postulated: that man is not only led toward political society by nature, but dragged into it, so that nature is the principal impelling cause for entering political society and all others, including need and fear, are to be regarded only as secondary and accidental causes. 93. See Institutes, bk. III, chap. i, §21. 482 institutes of divine jurisprudence§8. To take an example, the master-servant relationship is natural, even if humans invented it out of need.§9. If some quality, therefore, is said to inhere in a creature by nature or a creature is said to be suited for something from birth, this phrase sometimes means that a thing is actually present in something by nature, without any prior action by itself or someone else. In that sense, for example, a fish is born to swim, a bird to fly, an oak tree to bear acorns.§10. Sometimes, however, there is an aptitude or suitability in something to receive some sort of perfection, cultivation, or discipline which nature intended to be there, or certainly approves of as something that conforms to it and is not repugnant to it. In that sense a horse, for example, is naturally suited to...