Essays on Church, State, and Politics

Chapter II

367 u chapter ii u On the Duty of Man with Regard to Conjugal Society§1. Let us start with simple societies, because civil society is composed of these. Among these, conjugal society is the most natural, because all humans generally feel an instinctive desire within themselves to enter such a society.§2. It is difficult to explain what everyone’s duty is in that regard, because the matter has been greatly complicated by the controversies of theologians , jurists, and philosophers, who have often argued with more acrimony and subtlety than perspicuity and clarity.§3. Yet it seems that the main reason for this difficulty is that divine laws were often mixed with human laws; ignorance led to the confusion of natural law with universal positive law, or their separate discussion was sometimes neglected because of the purpose or the argument of the work.§4. In truth, God has reinforced no other society of human beings with as many particular precepts as conjugal society. We shall therefore make every effort to separate these precepts from the law of nature, although we shall start with the latter. We shall thereby be better able to explain later what revelation adds to reason.§5. But first I repeat the following, based on the hypotheses I have demonstrated so far: (1) By natural law we mean nothing other than the law 368 institutes of divine jurisprudence we have defined above, and the foundation of which, as we have shown, lies in the necessary conformity and nonconformity with the social, that is peaceful, nature of man.§6. (2) The conclusions or questions that occur here are to be examined according to the axioms listed in the preceding chapter, which all derive from this source [i.e., natural law].§7. (3) It automatically follows that the justice or injustice of the actions we are dealing with must be decided on the basis of these rules and that actions they clearly do not refer to are to be considered permitted, if we leave aside divine revelation.§8. (4) Yet we must take care to note that the term permitted action is not absolute, but stands in relation to a law, and describes that which is neither commanded nor prohibited by that law. When you find the term permitted action in the earlier part of this chapter you therefore must not assume that this action must be permitted under divine law. There we are only speaking of the law of nature. But there are many things forbidden by positive law that are not covered by natural law.§9. (5) Furthermore, even if what is called permitted lies somewhere in between precepts and prohibitions, this middle is not to be understood as a single point, but allows for some leeway: it is sometimes closer to a prohibition, and sometimes closer to a command. That is similar to the way in which the Peripatetics use the concept of the mean in explaining their concept of virtue.13§10. For those actions that further sociality or the purpose of a society by accident, but not necessarily, are closer to being commanded. On the other hand, those actions that disturb this purpose by accident are closer to being prohibited. If, therefore, we abstract from divine revelation, it 13. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.vi.4 (1106a). book iii 369 is more laudable to do the former and refrain from the latter. We shall, therefore, here add a degree of permissibility.§11. (6) Thus you must not be surprised if the final part of this discussion will show that some actions that on the basis of natural law seem closer to being commanded are prohibited by divine positive law. For divine prudence cannot be measured by the standards of human prudence, and it must be sufficient for us to know that these kinds of actions are not essential to sociality, especially as it may often be the case that several circumstances occur in one action at the same time, one of which tends to further sociality, while another tends to disturb the public peace. Thus, if we had no divine revelation, our reason would often be unsure whether it is more laudable to perform or refrain from such an action.§12. (7) Also, we must not ignore what we stressed above, that the following argument is not valid: actions that are commanded or forbidden in sacred Scripture...