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Chap. 2. Of the Rule of Human Actions, or of Laws in general
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42 the whole duty of man wronged Person, but refus’d it. To the third Sort are refer’d such as are of *counsel to the Design; † those that encourage and commend the Fact before it be done; and such as incite Men to sinning by their Example, and the like. u c h a p t e r i i u Of the Rule of Human Actions, or of Laws in general; and the different Qualifications of those Actions Because all Human Actions depending upon the Will, have their Estimate according to the concurrence thereof; but the Will of every Person not only differs in many respects from that of all others, but also alters and changes it self, becoming different in the same Person at one time from what it was before at another; therefore to preserve Decency and Order among Mankind, it was necessary there should be some Rule, by which they should be regulated. For otherwise, if, where there is so great a Liberty of the Will, and such Variety of Inclinations and Desires, any Man might do whatsoever he had a mind to, without any regard to some stated Rule, it could not but give occasion to vast Confusions among Mankind. *That is, when, for example, a Man advises another to steal this or that thing, shewing him at the same time the properest Manner to take it without discovery, the favourablest Time of conveying himself into the House where it is, the Place where the thing is reposited, the best Way of getting off with it, and the like Particulars; but this is not meant of simply advising any one in general terms to steal for his Support rather than starve. L. N. N. lib. I. cap. V. §14. [Barbeyrac’s XXVII.1, p. 26.] † That is, provided this Advice, these Encouragements and Commendations contribute to make him do the criminal Act; for in such case only the Imputation lies; otherwise the Person thus counselling and encouraging is only guilty of the ill Intention which he had. Lib. III. cap. I. §4. [Barbeyrac’s XXVII.2, p. 27.] L. N. N. l. 1. c. 5. §14. I. The Necessity of a Rule. L. N. N. l. 2. c. 1. according to the law of nature 43 This Rule is call’d Law; which is, *A Decree by which the Superior obliges one that is subject to him, to accommodate his Actions to the Directions prescrib’d therein.2 That this Definition may the better be understood, it must first be enquired , What is an Obligation; whence is its Original; who is capable of lying under an Obligation; and who it is that can impose it. By Obligation then is usually meant, A moral Bond, whereby we are ty’d down to do this or that, or to abstain from doing them.3 That is, hereby a kind of a Moral Bridle is put upon our Liberty; so that though the Will does actually drive another way, yet we find our selves hereby struck as it were with an internal Sense, that if our Action be not perform’d according to the prescript Rule, we cannot but confess we have not done right; and if any Mischief happen to us upon that Account, we may fairly charge our selves with the same; because it might have been avoided, if the Rule had been follow’d as it ought. And there are two Reasons why Man should be subject to an Obligation ; one is, because he is endow’d with a Will, which may be divers ways directed, and so be conform’d to a Rule: the other, because Man is not exempt from the Power of a Superior. For where the Faculties of any Agent are by Nature form’d only for one Way of acting, there ’tis to no purpose to expect any thing to be done of choice: and to such a Creature ’tis in vain to prescribe any Rule; because ’tis uncapable of understanding the same, or conforming its Actions thereto. Again, if there be any one who has no Superior, then there is no Power that can of right impose a Necessity upon him; and if he perpetually observes a certain Rule in what he does, and constantly abstains from doing many things, he is *On this Head consult H. Grotius de Jure Belli & Pacis, l. 1. c. 1. §9. 2. Pufendorf’s construction of law in terms of the...