Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion

Appendix. Significant Variant Readings

237 a p p e n d i x Significant Variant Readings Kames published three editions of his Essays (1751, 1758, and 1779). The first two editions were published anonymously; in the third edition Kames signed his name to the Preface. With each new edition, Kames made many changes, some of them stylistic, some of them concerning substantive issues. In revising his text for the second edition (of 1758), Kames focused on Part I, and especially on the “Liberty and Necessity” essay, which had involved him in a heated controversy with a group of Church of Scotland ministers headed by George Anderson. Many of the essays in Part II of the second edition were reprinted with only minor stylistic changes. For the third edition (of 1779), Kames made two kinds of significant revisions. First,in termsof alteringandcorrectingpreviouslypublishedmaterial, Kames again focused his energies on Part I, and especially on Essays II and III (“Foundation and Principles of Morality” and “Liberty and Necessity”). Once again, many of the essays in Part II appeared with only minor stylisticvariations. Where Kames did make a significant revision to Part II was in the addition of two entirely new essays. This appendix records some of the variations between the three editions. It does not offer a complete and exhaustive list of textual variants but rather provides a partial list based on two criteria. First, I have emphasized places in the text where Kames significantly qualifies or retracts an argument made in the previous editions. Second, I have briefly noted changes in the organization and presentation of theessays.Superscriptromannumeralsinthetextindicatewhere the following variations occur. 238 appendix Editions A. Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion. In Two Parts. Edinburgh , 1751. B. Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion. In Two Parts. The Second Edition. With Alterations and Additions. London, 1758. C. Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion. Corrected and improved , in a third edition. Several Essays added concerning the Proof of a Deity. Edinburgh and London, 1779. Variant Readings to Part I ii. foundation and principles of morality i. In A and B, this essay is entitled “Of the Foundations and Principles of the Law of Nature.”1 ii. In A and B (with slight stylistic variations from A), this paragraph reads: It is but a superficial account which is given of morality by most writers, that it depends upon Approbation and Disapprobation. For it is evident, that these terms are applicable to works of art, and to objects beneficial and hurtful, as well as to morality. It ought further to have been observed, that the approbation or disapprobation of actions, are feelings, very distinguishable from what relate to the objects now mentioned.Someactions are approved of as good and as fit, right and meet to be done; others are disapproved of as bad and unfit, unmeet and wrong to be done. In the one case, we approve of the actor as a good man; in the other, disapprove of him as a bad man. These feelings don’t apply to objects as fitted to an end, nor even to the end itself, except as proceeding from deliberate intention . When a piece of work is well executed, we approve of the artificer for his skill, not for his goodness. Several things inanimate, as well as animate , serve to extreme good ends. We approve of these ends as useful in 1. But throughout the text, C continues to speak of the principles and foundations of the law of nature. For Kames, and for most Scottish moral philosophers of the period (with the important exception of Hume), the laws of morality are the laws of nature. appendix 239 themselves, but not as morally fit and right, where they are not considered as the result of intention.2 iii. This paragraph was added to C.3 iv. In A, the next two paragraphs read: Upon a small degree of reflection, it will appear, that the whole system of morals is founded upon the supposition of liberty of action.* If actions were understood to be necessary, and no way under ourpowerorcontroul, we could never conceive them as fit or unfit to be done; as what we are indispensibly bound to do or not to do. To have such a feeling of human actions, upon the supposition of necessity, would be as...