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729 a p p e n d i x Terms defined or explained 1. Every thing we perceive or are conscious of, whether a being or a quality, a passion or an action, is with respect to the percipient termed an object. Some objects appear to be internal, or within the mind; passion, for example , thinking, volition; Some external; such as every object of sight, of hearing, of smell, of touch, of taste. 2. That act of the mind which makes known to me an external object, is termed perception. That act of the mind which makes known to me an internal object, is termed consciousness. The power or faculty from which consciousness proceeds, is termed an internal sense. The power or faculty from which perception proceeds, is termed an external sense. This distinction refers to the objects of our knowledge; for the senses, whetherexternal or internal, are all of them powers or faculties of the mind.* * I have complied with all who have gone before me in describing the senses internal andexternaltobe powersor faculties;andyet,aftermuchattention,Ihavenotdiscovered any thing active in their operations to entitle them to that character. Thefollowingchain of thought has led me to hesitate. One being operates on another: the first is active, the other passive. If the first act, it must have a power to act: if an effect be produced on the other, it must have a capacity to have that effect produced upon it. Fire melts wax: ergo fire has a power to produce that effect; and wax must be capable to have that effect produced in it. Now as to the senses. A tree in flourish makes an impression on me, and by that means I see the tree. But in this operation I do not find that the mind is active: seeing the tree is only an effect produced on it by intervention of the rays of light. What seems to have led us into an error is the word seeing, which, under the form of an active verb, has a passive signification. I feel is a similar example; for to feel is certainly not to act, but the effect of being acted upon: the feeling pleasure is the effect produced in my mind when a beautiful object is presented. Perception accordingly is not an action, but an effect produced in the mind. Sensation is another effect: it is the pleasure I feel upon perceiving what is agreeable. 730 appendix 3. Butas self isanobjectthatcannotbetermedeitherexternalorinternal, the faculty by which I have knowledge of myself, is a sense that cannot properly be termed either internal or external. 4. By the eye we perceive figure, colour, motion, &c.: by the ear we perceive the different qualities of sound, high, low, loud, soft: by touch we perceive rough, smooth, hot, cold, &c.: by taste we perceive sweet, sour, bitter, &c.: by smell we perceive fragrant, fetid, &c. These qualitiespartake the common nature of all qualities, that they are not capable of an independent existence, but must belong to some being of which they are properties or attributes. A being with respect to its properties or attributes is termed a subject, or substratum. Every substratum of visible qualities , is termed substance; and of tangible qualities, body. 5. Substance and sound are perceived as existing at a distance from the organ; often at a considerable distance. But smell, touch, and taste, are perceived as existing at the organ of sense. 6. The objects of external sense are various. Substances are perceived by the eye; bodies by the touch. Sounds, tastes, and smells, passing commonly under the name of secondary qualities, requiremoreexplanationthanthere is room for here. All the objects of internal sense are attributes: witness deliberation, reasoning, resolution, willing, consenting, which are internal actions. Passions and emotions, which are internal agitations, are also attributes . With regard to the former, I am conscious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am conscious of being passive. 7. Again, we are conscious of internal action as in the head; of passions and emotions as in the heart. 8. Many actions may be exerted internally, and many effects produced, of which we are unconscious: when we investigate the ultimate cause of the motion of the blood, and of other internal motions upon which life depends, it is the most probable opinion that some internal power is the cause; and if so, we are unconscious of the operations of thatpower. But consciousness being implied in the very meaning of deliberating, reasoning, resolving, willing, consenting, such operations cannot escape...

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