Elements of Criticism: In Two Volumes

Chapter 3. Beauty

141 u chapter iii u Beauty Having discoursed in general of emotions and passions, Iproceedtoamore narrow inspection of such of them as serve to unfold the principles of the fine arts. It is the province of a writer uponethics, togiveafullenumeration of all the passions; and of each separately to assign the nature, the cause, the gratification, and the effects. But a treatise of ethics is not my province: I carry my view no farther than to the elements of criticism, in order to show, that the fine arts are a subject of reasoning as well as of taste. An extensive work would ill suit a design so limited; and to confine this work within moderate bounds, the following plan may contribute. The observation made above, that things are the causes of emotions, by means of their properties and attributes,* furnisheth a hint for distribution. Instead of a painful and tedious examination of the several passions and emotions, I purpose to confine my inquiries to such attributes, relations, and circumstances , as in the fine arts are chiefly employ’d to raise agreeable emotions. Attributes of single objects, as the most simple, shall take the lead; to be followed with particulars, which, depending on relations, are not found in single objects. Dispatching next some coincident matters, I proceed to my chief aim; which is, to establish practical rules for the fine arts, derived from principles previously established. This is a general view of the intended method; reserving however a privilege to vary it in particular instances , where a deviation may be more commodious. I begin with beauty, the most noted of all the qualities that belong to single objects. The term beauty, in its native signification, is appropriated to objects of * Chap. 2. part 1. sect. 1. first note. 142 chapter iii sight: objects of the other senses may be agreeable, such as the sounds of musical instruments, the smoothness and softness of some surfaces;butthe agreeableness denominated beauty belongs to objects of sight. Of all the objects of external sense, an object of sight is the most complex : in the very simplest, colour is perceived, figure, and length, breadth, and thickness. A tree is composed of a trunk, branches, and leaves; it has colour, figure, size, and sometimes motion: by means of each of these particulars , separately considered, it appears beautiful; how much more so, when they are all united together? The beauty of the human figure is extraordinary , being a composition of numberless beauties arising from the parts and qualities of the object, various colours, various motions, figures, size, &c.; all united in one complex object, and strikingtheeyewith combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality so remarkable in visible objects, lends its name to express every thing that is eminently agreeable: thus, by a figure of speech, we say a beautiful sound, a beautiful thought or expression, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful discovery in art or science. But as figurative expression is the subject of a following chapter, this chapter is confined to beauty in its proper signification. It is natural to suppose, that a perception so various as that of beauty, comprehending sometimes many particulars, sometimes few, should occasion emotions equally various: and yet all the various emotions of beauty maintain one common character, that of sweetness and gaiety. Considering attentively the beauty of visible objects, we discover two kinds.1 The first may be termed intrinsic beauty, because it is discovered in a single object viewed apart without relation to any other: the examples above givenareof thatkind.Theothermaybetermedrelative beauty,being founded on the relation of objects. The purposed distribution would lead me to handle these beauties separately; but they are frequentlysointimately connected, that, for the sake of connection, I am forc’d in this instance to vary from the plan, and to bring them both into the same chapter. Intrinsic beauty is an object of sense merely: to perceive the beauty of a spreading oak or of a flowing river, no more is required but singly an act 1. Kames’s references to intrinsic and relative beauty, and the beauty of utility, allude to contemporary debate: see the editor’s Introduction. beauty 143 of vision. The perception of relative beauty is accompanied with an act of understanding and reflection; for of a fine instrument or engine, we perceive not the relative beauty, until we be made acquainted with its use and destination...