Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind

Chapter 2. On the Will

126 c h a p t e r 2 On the Will 1. What the will is As soon as an image of good or evil is presented tothemind,anotherfaculty of thesoul comesintoaction,whichisdistinctfromeverysenseandiscalled the will; it seeks (appetens) every kind of pleasant sensation and all actions, events, or external things which seem likely to arouse them, and shuns and rejects everything contrary to them. [Innate in every man is a constant desire (appetitio) for happiness, which never fails to display itself, when opportunity offers, in pursuing (appetendo) things that seem to make for a happy life and in spurning things that do not. There is, however, no innate notion of the supreme good, or of an aggregation of all goods, to which we may refer all our intentions. What it would be correct to say is that the mind, so long as it maintains a calm and provident motion, is formed to seek every good thing in itself and to shun every evil; and when several things come before it which it cannot have all at the same time, it turns to those which seem greater and more excellent. The same should also be said of warding off evils. Hence we must often reject pleasures which it is not possible to enjoy without the loss of greater and more lasting [pleasures], or which are followed by more serious pains.Andlikewisepainsmustsometimes be borne, if that is the only way we can obtain greater pleasures or avoid more serious pains.]1 1. The sentences between brackets were added in 1744. part ii: on the human mind 127 The two meanings of desiring Just as we include among the operations of the understanding not only sensations which are perceived by the body and are common to us with the brute animals, but also the nobler powers of perception which are proper to man and which convey the notion of superior goods, so also man’sdesire (appetitus) is twofold. One desire we share with the dumb animals. It is called sensual [desire] and directs us toward pleasure by a kind of blind instinct; it is driven by a quite violentemotionof themindtoobtaincertain sensual goods and avoid sensual ills. The other is a calm emotion which calls in the counsel of reason and pursues things that are judged, in thelight of all the circumstances, to be superior, and are seized by a nobler sense. It is called rational [desire], or will in the proper sense.2 We will first give an account of this desire; it is common to us with every creatureendowedwith reason. 2. Rational desire Such a desire or aversion arises spontaneously when an image of good or evil is presented and considered in all its circumstances, without a prior decision or command of the will. A desire or aversion is very oftenfollowed closely by a kind of deliberation aboutall theargumentsandconsiderations in favor of getting the thing we want or of avoiding the thing we dislike. After these arguments and considerations have been explored, therefollows an intention (propositum) or determination (consilium) to do those things that seem most likely to achieve the end. The first desire or aversion the scholastics call simple wanting; the intention to act, after the agent, so far 2. The distinction between sensual desire and rational desire was a commonplace in the writing of scholastic moralists: for example, in Eustache, Ethica, I, pp. 10–11, and Heereboord, Collegium Logicum Pneumaticae, I, 8, p. 43. Hutcheson insisted upon it in later editions of An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections (1742), sec. 2, p. 32n., and Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1742), sec. 1, p. 214, against his rationalist critics, who would reduce all actions, desires, and volitions to exercises of the intellect or understanding. 128 a synopsis of metaphysics as his intelligence and diligence allows, has weighed everything that precedes , accompanies, or seems likely to follow the action, they call efficacious volition.3 How mixed things are desired Just as we seek by nature every good which is worthy in itself and shun every evil, so when good things are mingled with ills, the will inclines to those which seem more numerous and more excellent. Thus there is a certain deliberation about ends themselves, or about things which seem good or evil in themselves and which are called objective ends, though there is no deliberation about the ultimate end, the formal...