An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

Section VII. A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, from this moral Sense

177 u s e c t i o n v i i u A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, from this moral Sense. I. To conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the true Original of moral Ideas,viz.ThismoralSenseof Excellenceinevery Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence㛳1 . It remains to be explain’d, how we acquire more particular Ideas of Virtue and Vice, abstracting㛳 from any Law, Human, or Divine. If any one ask, Can we have any Sense of Obligation, 㛳2 abstracting㛳 from the Laws of a Superior? We must answer according to the various Senses of the word Obligation. If by Obligation we understand a Determination , without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination shall alsomakeusdispleas’d with our selves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to 㛳3 it㛳; in this meaning of the word Obligation, [267] there is naturally an Obligation upon all Men to Benevolence; and they are still under its Influence,even when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of 㛳4 their㛳 Actions, this moral Sense leads them to Evil; unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken’d. For it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same purpose, this internal Sense, and Instinct 㛳5 toward㛳 Benevolence, will either influence our Actions, or 㛳6 else㛳 make us very uneasy and dissatisfy’d; and weshall beconscious that we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any Law whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impendObligation . 178 treatise ii ing from its Sanctions. And further, there are still such Indicationsgiven us of what is in the whole 㛳7 benevolent㛳, and what not; as may probably discover to us the true Tendency of every Action, and let us see, some time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear’d 㛳8 benevolent㛳: 㛳9 or if we have no Friends so faithful as to admonish us, the Persons injur’d will not fail to upbraid us.㛳 So that no Mortal can secure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, andSelf-approbation, but by a serious Inquiry into the Tendency of his Actions, and a perpetual Study of universal Good㛳10 , according to the justest Notions of it㛳. [268] But if by Obligation, we understand a Motive from Self-interest,sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely, to a certain Course of Actions; we may have a Sense of such 㛳11 an㛳 Obligation, by reflecting on this Determination of our Nature to approve Virtue, to be pleas’d and happy when we reflect upon our having done virtuous Actions, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of Virtue to any other Enjoyment.* We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of Obligation, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Course of benevolent and social Actions, to be the most probable means of promoting the natural Good of every Individual; as Cumberland and Puffendorf have prov’d: And all this without Relation to a Law. But further, if our moral Sense be suppos’d exceedingly weaken’d, and the selfish Passions grown strong, either thro some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our Understanding be weak,and we be often in danger of being hurry’d by our Passions into precipitate and rash [269] Judgments, that malicious Actions shall 㛳12 promote our Advantage more㛳 than Beneficence; in such a Case, if it be inquir’dwhat is necessary to engage Men to beneficent Actions, or induce a steady Sense of an Obligation to act for the publick Good; then, no doubt, “A Law with Sanctions, given by a superior Being, of sufficient Power to make us happy or miserable, must benecessarytocounter-ballancethose * See above, Sect. vi. Art. 1, 2. section vii 179 apparent Motives of Interest, to calm our Passions, and give room for the recovery of our moral Sense, or at least for a just View of our Interest.” II. Now the principal Business of the moral Philosopher is to shew,from solid Reasons, “That universal Benevolence tends to the Happiness of the Benevolent, either from the Pleasuresof Reflection,Honour,natural...