An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

Section VI. Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs

163 u s e c t i o n v i u Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs. I. It may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruptionof Manners so justly complain’d of every where, this moral Sense has a greater Influence on Mankind than is generally imagin’d, althoitisoften directed by very partial imperfect Views of publick Good, and often overcome by Self-love. But we shall offer some further Considerations, to prove, “That it gives us more Pleasure and Pain than all our other Facultys.” And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, “That 㛳1 whereever 㛳 any morally good Quality gives Pleasure from Reflection, or from Honour, the contrary evil one will give proportionable Pain, from Remorse and Shame.” Now we shall consider the moral Pleasures, notonly separately, but as they are the most delightful Ingredient in the ordinary Pleasures of Life. [243] All 㛳2 Men㛳 seem persuaded of some Excellency in the Possession of good moral Qualitys, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on the contrary, look upon a State of moral Evil, as worse and more wretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment in this matter from the Actions of Men; for however they may be influenc ’d by moral Sentiments, yet it is certain, that Self-interestedPassions frequently overcome them, and partial Views of the Tendency of Actions , make us do what is really morally evil, apprehending it to be good. But let us examine the Sentiments which Men universally form of the State of others, when they are no way immediately concern’d; for in Importance of the Moral Sense. 164 treatise ii these Sentiments human Nature is calm and undisturb’d, and shews its true Face. Now 㛳3 should㛳 we imagine a rational Creature in a sufficientlyhappy State, 㛳4 tho his㛳 Mind was, without Interruption, wholly occupy’dwith pleasant Sensations of Smell, Taste, Touch, &c. if at the same time all other Ideas were excluded? 㛳5 Should㛳 we not think the State low, mean and sordid, if there were no Society, no Love or Friendship, no good Offices? What then must that State be wherein there are no Pleasures but those of the external Senses, with such long Intervals as human Nature at present [244] must have? Do these short Fits of Pleasure make the Luxurious happy? How insipid and joyless are the Reflections on past Pleasure? And how poor a Recompence is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the nauseous Satietys, and Languors in theIntervals? This Frame of our Nature, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the external Senses, points out to us, “That there must be some other more durable Pleasure, without such tedious Interruptions, and nauseous Reflections.” Let us even join with the Pleasures of the external Senses, the Perceptions of Beauty, Order, Harmony. These are no doubt more noble Pleasures, and seem to inlarge the Mind; and yet how cold and joyless are they, if there be no moral Pleasures of Friendship, Love and Beneficence ? Now if the bare Absence of moral Good, makes, in our Judgment , the State of a rational Agent contemptible; the Presence of contrary Dispositions is always imagin’d by us to sink him into a degree of Misery, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a wrathful, malicious,revengeful, or envious Being, tho we were at the same time to enjoy all 㛳6 the Pleasures of the external and internal Senses? The internal Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, contribute greatly indeed toward soothing㛳 the [245] Mind into a forgetfulness of Wrath, Malice or Revenge; and they must do so, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while these Affections possess the Mind, there is nothing but Torment and Misery. What Castle-builder, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he 㛳7 should㛳 be happy, ever made acknowledg’d Castle-builders prove it. section vi 165 Treachery, Cruelty, or Ingratitude, the Steps by which he mounted to his wish’d for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain’d it? We always conduct our selves in such Resveries, according to theDictates of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Courage; andthelowestwecansink, is hoping we may be enrich’d by some innocent Accident. O si urnam Argenti...