An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

Section IV. All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals

136 u s e c t i o n i v u All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals. I. To 㛳1 shew㛳 how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the universal Foundation of this moral Sense, viz. Benevolence, we have observ’d already,㛳2 *㛳 that when we are ask’d the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we 㛳3 perpetually㛳 alledge its Usefulness to the Publick, and not to the Actor himself. If we are vindicating a censur’d Action, and maintaining it lawful, we 㛳4 always㛳 make this one Article of our Defence, “That it injur’d no body, or did more Good than Harm.” On the other hand, when we blame any piece of Conduct, we shew it to be prejudicial to others, besides the Actor; or to evidence at least a Neglect of their Interest, when it was in our power to serve them; or when Gratitude, natural Affection, or some other disinterested Tye [197] should have rais’d in us a Study of their Interest. 㛳5a If we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any reflection upon its Tendency to publick Evil, it is 㛳6b still occasion’db 㛳 by our Benevolence, which makes us concern’d for the Evils befalling 㛳7c the Agent, whomwe must always look upon as a part of the System.ac 㛳 We all know howgreat an Extenuation of Crimes 㛳8 it㛳 is, to alledge, “That the poor Man does harm to no body but himself;” and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet 㛳9 if we examine the Matter well,㛳 we shall find, that the * See above, Sect. iii, Art. 3. Par. 3. This Moral Sense universal. section iv 137 greatest part of the Actions which are immediately prejudicial to our selves, and are often look’d upon as innocent toward others, do really tend to the publick Detriment, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps wouldhave 㛳10 been㛳 inclin’d to do. This is the Case of Intemperance and extravagant Luxury. II. And further, we may observe, that no Action of any other Personwas ever approv’d by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill grounded, of some really good moral Quality. If we observe theSentimentsof Men concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is 㛳11 always㛳 some really amiable and benevolent Appearance which engages their Approbation. We may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging 㛳12 that Actions tend㛳 [198] to the publick Good, which do not; or be so 㛳13 stupidly㛳 inadvertent, that while our Attention is fix’d on some partial good Effects, we may quite over-look many evil Consequences which counter-ballance the Good.OurReasonmaybeverydeficientinitsOffice,bygivinguspartial Representations of the tendency of Actions; but it is still some apparent Species of Benevolence which commands our Approbation. And this Sense, like our other Senses, tho counter-acted 㛳14 from Motives of external Advantage, which are stronger than it㛳, 㛳15 ceases not㛳 to operate, but 㛳16 has Strength enough to make㛳 us uneasy and dissatisfy’d withour selves; even as the Sense of Tasting 㛳17 makes㛳 us loath, and dislike the nauseous Potion which we may 㛳18 force㛳 our selves, from Interest, to swallow. It is therefore to no purpose to alledge here, “That many Actions are really done, and approv’d, which tend to the universal Detriment.” For the same way, Actions are often perform’d, and in the mean time approv ’d, 㛳19 which tend㛳 to the Hurt of the Actor. But as we do not from the latter, infer the Actor to be void of Self-Love, or a Sense of Interest; no more should we infer from the former, that such Men are void of a Sense of Morals, or a desire of publick [199] Good. The matterisplainly this. Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions either to publick , or private Good: Nay, sometimes violent Passions, while they last, will make 㛳20 them㛳 approve very bad Actions 㛳21 in a moral㛳 Sense, Benevolence the sole ground of Approbation. False Approbations. 138 treatise ii 㛳22 or㛳 very pernicious ones to the Agent, 㛳23 as㛳 advantageous: But this proves only, “That sometimes there may be some more violent Motive to Action, than a Sense of moral Good; or that 㛳24 Men, by Passion...