An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

Section III. The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The Manner of computing the Morality of Actions

116 u s e c t i o n i i i u The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The Manner of computing the Morality of Actions. I. If we examine all the Actions which are counted amiable any where, and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are approv’d, we shall find, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they 㛳1 always 㛳 appear as Benevolent, or flowing from 㛳2 Love of others㛳,and㛳3 a㛳 Study of their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons belov’d, or profited, or not; so that all those kind Affections which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos’d to flow from such Affections, appear morally Good, if while they are benevolent toward some Persons, they be not pernicious to others. Nor shall we find any thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no Benevolence imagin’d; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos ’d applicable to, and design’d for benevolent Purposes. Nay, as was before observ’d,* [163] the Actions which in fact are exceedingly useful, shall appear void of moral Beauty, if we 㛳5 know㛳 they proceeded from no kind Intentions 㛳6 toward㛳 others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of promoting publick Good, shall appear as amiable as the most successful, if it flow’d from as strong Benevolence. * See Sect. ii. Art. 3. Par. 1. Art. 㛳4 6. Par. 2㛳. All Virtue Benevolent. section iii 117 II. 㛳7 Hence those㛳 Affections which would lead us to do good to our Benefactor, shall appear amiable, and the contrary Affections odious, even when our Actions cannot possibly be of any advantage or hurt to him. Thus a sincere Love and Gratitude toward our Benefactor, a chearful Readiness to do whatever he shall require, how burdensom soever, a hearty InclinationtocomplywithhisIntentions,andContentmentwith the State he has plac’d us in, are the strongest Evidences of Benevolence we can shew to such a Person; and therefore they must appear exceedingly amiable. And under these is included all the rational Devotion, or Religion toward a Deity apprehended as Good, which we can possibly perform. We may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the Frame of our Nature, which is wonderfully adapted to promote Benevolence,viz. that as a Benefit conferr’d necessarily raises Gratitude in the [164] 㛳9 Person who receives it㛳, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are wonderfully delightful to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather chuse to be 㛳10 lov’d㛳, than hated, if their Love no way evidenc’d us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern’d in their Meanness. And thus the most abject 㛳11 Person oblig’d㛳 is capable, and inclin’d to make no small addition to our Happiness by his Love, and Gratitude, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus, ——— A grateful Mind By owing owes not, 㛳12 and㛳 still pays, at once Indebted and discharg’d ———* As to external Performances of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations, and Ages; and Education may give Men Opinions , that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the Deity : but then wherever any external Rite of Worship is approv’d, there also it is look’d upon to proceed from Love toward the Deity, or some * Par. Lost, B. iv. l. 55. Religion. 㥋8 Gratitude.㥋 118 treatise ii other Affec-[165]tion necessarily join’d with Love, as Reverence,Repentance , or Sorrow to have offended. So that the general Principleof Love, is the Foundation of all the apparent moral Excellence, even in the most fantastick Rites of Worship which were ever approv’d. For as to Rites design’d only to appease a furious Being, no Mortal, I fancy, apprehends there is any Virtue, or Excellence in them; but that they are chosen only as the dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are various 㛳13 speculative㛳 Opinions about what is acceptable to the Deity, it necessarily follows, “That, accordingly, Practices, and Approbation, must be various; tho all the moral Goodness of Actions is...