An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

Section I. Concerning some Powers of Perception distinct from what is generally understood by Sensation

19 An Inquiry 㛳2 Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.㛳 u s e c t i o n i u Concerning some Powers of Perception, distinct from what is generally understood by Sensation. To make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to premise some Definitions, and Observations, either universallyacknowledg ’d, or sufficiently prov’d by many Writers both ancient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called Sensations, and the Actions of the Mind consequent upon them. Art. 㛳3 I㛳. Those Ideas 㛳4 which㛳 are rais’d in the Mind uponthepresence of external Ob-[2]jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call’d Sensations . We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception , as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be acted upon by the external Object. II. When two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, different Senses. Thus Seeing and Hearing denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho Colours have 㛳6 vast㛳 Differences among themselves , as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence 㥋5 Sensation.㥋 Different Senses. 20 treatise i we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except Feeling, which is in some degree diffus’d over the whole Body. III. The Mind has a Power of compounding Ideas, 㛳7 which㛳 were receiv ’d separately; of comparing 㛳8 their㛳 Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their Relations and Proportions; of enlarging and diminishing its Ideas at pleasure, or in any certain Ratio, or Degree; and of considering separately [3] each of the simple Ideas, which might perhaps have been impress’d jointly in the Sensation. This last Operation we commonly call Abstraction. IV. The Ideas of 㛳9 Substances㛳 are compounded of the various simple Ideas jointly impress’d, when they presented themselves to our Senses. We define Substances only by enumerating these sensible Ideas: And such Definitions may 㛳10 raise an Idea clear enough㛳 of the Substance in the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv’d the Substance; provided he has separately receiv’d by his Senses all the simple Ideas 㛳11 which㛳 are in the Composition of the complex one of the Substance defin’d: But if 㛳12 there be any simple Ideas which he has not receiv’d, or if he wants any of the Senses necessary for the Perception of them, no Definition can raise any simple Idea which has not been before perceived by the Senses.㛳 V.13 Hence it follows, “That when Instruction, Education, or Prejudice of any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an Object, this Desire or Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of some Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those Qualitys, for Perception of which we have the proper Senses.” Thus if Beauty be desir’d by one who has not the Sense of Sight, the Desire must be rais’d by some [4] apprehended Regularity of Figure, Sweetness of Voice, Smoothness, or Softness, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of Colour. VI. Many of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful, immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of thisPleaThe Mind how active. Substances. Education. Instruction. Pleasure. Pain. section i 21 sure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what further Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from 㛳14 a㛳 prospect of further Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from 㛳15 an㛳 apprehension of Evil. VII. The 㛳16 simple㛳 Ideas rais’d in different Persons by the same Object, are probably 㛳17 some way㛳 different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his Fancy at one time differs from what it was at another. This will...