A Methodical System of Universal Law

Chapter VII: Concerning our absolute and perfect duties towards (others in general), and of not hurting or injuring others (in particular)

131 u c h a p t e r v i i u Concerning our absolute and perfect duties towards (others in general), and of not hurting or injuring others (in particular). section clxxii Let us now proceed to consider our duties towards others, the foundation of which lies, as was observed above, in this, that man is by nature equal to man, and therefore every man is obliged to love every other with a love of friendship (§85 & 88). And because equality of nature requires equality of offices, hence we concluded, that every man is obliged to love every man no less than himself (§93). section clxxiii We have also shewn that there are two degrees of this love, one of which we called love of justice, and the other love of humanity and beneficence (§82 & seq.) But because the former consists in doing nothing that may render one more unhappy, and therefore in not hurting any person, and in giving to every one his own, or what is due to him; and the latter consists in endeavouring, to the utmost of our ability, to increase and promote another’s perfection and happiness, and in rendering to him even what we do not owe to him by strict and perfect obligation; the consequence of this is, that of the duties we owe to others, some are duties of justice, which are of perfect obligation, and others are duties of humanity and beneficence, which are of imperfect obligation. The foundation of our duties towards others. They are either perfect or imperfect. 132 the laws of nature and nations section clxxiv Therefore those are perfect duties, to which one is bound by such perfect obligation, that he may be forced to perform them; such as to injure no person, and torender toeveryonewhatisduetohim:thoseareimperfect, to which we cannot be forced, but are only bound by the intrinsic goodness of the actions themselves; such as, to study to promote the perfection and happiness of others to the utmost of our power (§84).* section clxxv Since perfect duties may be reduced to not injuring any one, and rendering to every one his due (§174); but to injure, is to render one more unhappy than he is by nature, or would otherwise be (§82); and one may call that his due, or his own, which he hath justly acquired (§82); it follows, that obligation not to injure any one is natural; and obligation to render to every one his due is acquired; whence the former is called absolute, and the latter we call hypothetical.† * Perfect duties therefore lay us under a necessity of not rendering any one more imperfect or more unhappy: imperfect duties shew us, that we then only arrive to the glory of being truly good and virtuous, when we delight in promoting the perfection and happiness of others, as much as in us lies. These duties were accurately distinguished by ancient lawyers, when with Paullus they said, some were rather of good will and virtue than of necessity (voluntatis & officii magis quam necessitatis) l. 17.§3. D. commodati. Add to this a passage of Seneca quoted above in the scholium upon §84. † Absolute duty is what one man has a right to exact from another, without any right acquired to himself by any previous deed: hypothetical duty is what one can exact from another, in consequence of a right acquired by some deed. Thus a man has a right, to exact from every other that he should not take away his life, which is not acquired by any particular deed: But no person hath a right to complain, that things are taken from him by another unjustly, unless he hath acquired a right or property in them by some deed: therefore, not to kill any one is a duty of an absolute nature: but not to steal, is a duty of a hypothetical kind. If Salmasius had attended to this distinction (Salmasius de usur. cap. 9.) [[Claude Saumaise (Claudius Salmasius ), De usuris liber]] he would easily have understood why the lawyers said that theft is forbidden by natural law (furtum admittere jure naturali prohibitum esse) l. 1. §3. D. de furt. §1. Inst. de oblig. quae ex delict. These duties defined. They are divided into absolute and hypothetical. book i, chapter vii 133 section clxxvi Further, since the right we acquire to any thing arises either from dominion , or from compact or...