A Methodical System of Universal Law

Chapter II: Concerning the nature and distinguishing qualities or characteristics of human actions

30 u c h a p t e r i i u Concerning the nature and distinguishing qualities or characteristics of human actions. section xxiv From what hath been said of the foundation and origine of the law of nature and nations, it is obvious, that it hath for its object and scope the direction of human conduct; and therefore order makesitnecessary to enquire accurately into the qualities and characteristics of human actions. section xxv Experience, the fountain of all knowledge, teaches us, that various motions and changes happen in the human mind; but since no motion can be produced or conceived without a sufficient moving cause, the motions which happen in the mind of man must have some sufficient cause, which must either be within or without man. And therefore motions , the sufficient cause of which is in man himself, are called actions; and those the cause of which must be sought after without man, are termed passions. But because the motion called action, either produces nothing without the mind, but rests there, or produces by will some effect in the body, the former are denominated internal, the latter external actions. Transition to treat of human actions. What is meant by action and what by passion ? What by external and what by internal action? book i, chapter ii 31 section xxvi Passions not proceeding from us, but from some external cause, are so far without our power, and therefore are not unfrequently excited in us against our will or inclination; yet they may sometimes be as it were repulsed and prevented, if we are provided with sufficient force to resist the external exciting cause; and on the other hand, in certain circumstances we can assist the external mover, so as that the motion it tends to produce may be more easily excited in us. Whenceitfollowsthatsome passions are within our power, and others are not.* section xxvii Because the law of nature hath only free actions for its object, (§4) it cannot have for its object, in order to be directed by it, passions which are not within our power. Tho’ it may lay down some rules relative to our passions, so far as they are in our power, yet, properly speaking,these rules are not directions to our passions, but to those free actions, by which we can resist or assist these passions, shewing what we ought to do with regard to hindering or forwarding them.† * All this may be illustrated by clear examples. To be warmed is a passion; sometimes we cannot avoid it, as when we are making a journey in very warm air: sometimes we can, as when in winter we remove farther from the fire: and sometimes we can as it were assist the cause, as by drawing nearer to a fire that we may become warmer. To be warmed is therefore sometimes in our power, and sometimes without our power. † Thus laws cannot be prescribed to the passion of anger, but reasoncan giverules to our free actions, and directs us not to give loose reins to anger, but to resist its first motions, lest it should become impetuous and ungovernable, and to forbear acting while the mind is in too great a ferment and perturbation, &c. Who will deny that he acts contrary to the law of reason who does not observe these rules? Nothing can be more true than what Cicero says, Tusc. qu. l. 3. “All the diseases and disturbances of the mind proceed from the neglect or despight of reason, i.e. from not observing those prescriptions which reason dictates to us for hindering the mind from being overpowered by violent commotions.” [[Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes (Tusculan Disputations), bk. 4, xiii.31.]] Passions of what kinds are they? Whether they are subject to our direction or not? 32 the laws of nature and nations section xxviii The law of nature therefore only extends to our actions; but let it be observed, that tho’ the sufficient cause of all these be in man himself, (§25) yet experience teaches us, that of some actions we are conscious and are absolute masters; others are of such a nature that they proceed from some mechanical disposition, in such a manner that we are not always consciousof them, nor havethemnotwhollyinourpower.* section xxix Actions of which we are conscious, and which are within our power,and subject to our direction, are properly termed human or moral actions; those...