A Methodical System of Universal Law

Chapter I: Concerning the origine and foundation of the Law of Nature and Nations

11 the laws of Nature and Nations deduced, &c. book i Of the Law of Nature u c h a p t e r i u Concerning the origine and foundation of the Law of Nature and Nations. section i Whatever tends to preserve and perfect man is called good with respect to man: whatever hath a contrary tendency is called ill with regard to him:* every action therefore which contributes to human preservation and perfection is a good action; and every action is evil which tends to hurt and destroy man, or to hinder his advancement to the perfection of which his nature is capable. * This is the true idea of perfection according to Simplicius, who upon Epictetus Enchir. cap. 34. observes, to have not only a beginning and a middle, but likewise an end, is the characteristick of perfection. [[Simplicius, On Epictetus’ Handbook (Commentarius in Enchiridion Epicteti).]] So Aristotle likewise, in Meta. c. 4. 16. where having examined the meaning of several different terms, he reduces them all to the same idea. [[Aristotle, The Metaphysics.]] What constitutes a good, and what a bad action? 12 the laws of nature and nations section ii Whatever conduces in any manner or degree towards our duration, or the continuance of our present state, is said to be preservative of man: whatever promotes and augments those properties, which belonging to human nature, and constituting our state and rank, admits of degrees, is called perfective of man.* Whence it is easy to under-stand what may be said to hurt, wrong, or degrade us. section iii Such being the nature of human will, that it always desires good, and abhorsill;† itcannotbut likethoseactionswhichtendtoourpreservation and perfection, and it cannot but dislike those actions which tend to our hurt and imperfection: But because good and ill may be really what they appear to be, and on the other hand, a seeming good may be a real evil, and a seeming evil may be a real good;† it very often happens, that like Ixion in the fable, we embrace an empty cloud instead of Juno;1 i.e. we are deceived by appearances, and mistake seeming for solid good, and a false semblance of ill for real ill; and thus we may make a bad or a good choice, be right or wrong in our elections, and consequently in our actions.† * [[See note on previous page.]] † This is observed by Simplicius upon Epictet. Enchir. cap. 34. where he greatly exalts human liberty, and defines it to be that free constitution of the human mind, in consequence of which it voluntarily, and without any constraint, sometimes pursues true, and sometimes imaginary good. 1. Ixion was invited to a banquet by Jupiter but planned to seduce Jupiter’s wife, Juno. Jupiter, however, deceived him by shaping an image of Juno out of a cloud. When Ixion embraced the cloud, he was caught by Jupiter and punished. What preservation and perfection mean, and what destruction and imperfection? Men have power to act well or ill. book i, chapter i 13 section iv Now the power of preferring one or other of two possibles, and by consequence of acting well or ill, is called liberty: this power we experience; wherefore it cannot be denied that there are, with regard to us, free actions which are good, and free actions which arebad. But sinceallthings, which may be rightly directed or perverted, stand in need of a rule by which they may be rightly directed, it follows that our free actions ought to be directed by some rule.* section v By a rule here we understand an evident criterion by which good and ill may be certainly distinguished. And in order to answer that end, a rule must be true, right or just, clear, certain and constant. For suppose the rule not to be just, and that which is ruled by it will not be just or right. Suppose it not to be clear and certain, and it cannot be a sure criterion of good and evil. Finally, if we suppose it to be uncertain and variable, an action regulated by it will sometimes be good and sometimes be bad: and therefore in none of these cases would it deserve the name of arule.† * Thus Epictetus reasons in Arrian, l. 2. c. xi. Do you think all things are right which appear to be such to any one? but how can things...