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1475 u c h a p t e r x i i i u Moderation about Things taken in War. I. 1. But the taking away of our Enemies Goods in a just War, is not to be reputed wholly innocent, or clear from the Obligationof Restitution. For 1 if we respect that which is done rightly, it is not really lawful to take, or keep from the Enemy more than may be justly due from him, except what Things (beyond the same due) we are obliged to detain for our own necessary Security; but when the Danger is over, they are also to be restored, either in Kind, or to the full Value; according to the Principles we have laid down in the second Book, Chap. II. For what we may lawfully do with the Goods of those that are at Peace with us, we may do it much more to those of our Enemy. This then is a Sort of Right to take, without a Right of acquiring. 2. But since a Debt may arise to us, either from the Inequality of Things, 2 or by way of Punishment, we may on either of these accounts seize on the Goods of the Enemy, but with some Difference; for as we I. (1) See the Opinion of Pope Innocent related by Bembo, Hist. Lib. I. Grotius. This was Pope Innocent VII. whose Nuncio’s declared in his Name at Trent, that the Emperor Sigismond, having been the Aggressor in the War with the Grisons, and the Venetians at great Expences to support that War; the latter had a Right to keep two Forts, which they had taken from the Emperor: But however, that the Holy Father prayed the Senate of Venice, that they would consent to restore those Places, to avoid giving Occasion for a Rupture between the Emperor and the Holy See, &c. Hist. Venet. Lib. I. Fol. 12. Edit. Venet. 1551. 2. The Romans condemned Prusias, King of Bithynia, not only to make Attalus, King of Pergamus amends, but to pay him a Sum of Money, by way of Penalty. Appian. Alexand. De Bell. Mithridat. (p. 172, 173. Edit. H. Steph.) I. That so much of the Goods of the Enemies Subjects taken in War, may be detained, as comes to the Value of what is due to us. 1476 chapter xiii said a before, from that former Obligation, not only the Goods of the Debtor, but also those of his Subjects by the allowed Law of Nations (as by way of Suretyship) stand engaged; which Law of Nations we look upon to be of another Kind, than that which consistsina bareImpunity, or of which the Use is maintained and authorised only externally, by the Effect of a Sentence, whether just or unjust. For as by our own personal Consent, our Dealer [[ei qui cum actum est]] does not only acquire an external Right, but also an internal one; (that is, which he may in Conscience make use of.) So also by a certain general Consent,which vertually comprehends in it, the Consent of each Individual. In which Sense the Law is called 3 pólewc sunjh́kh koinh ’, A general Convention of the State. And it is the more probable, that it was thought proper by Nations, that in such a Case, such a Right might be allowed, because this Law of Nations 4 was intended, not only to prevent greater Mischiefs , but also to enable every Person to recover his Due. II. But, if the Prince’s Debt be penal, I do not see that by the Consent of Nations, such a Right is allowed on his Subjects Goods. For such an Obligation upon another Man’s Goods is odious, and therefore not to be extended beyond the manifest Intention of those who authorise it. 1 Besides, there is no Reason of Utility so weighty, as could have induced Nations to establish in regard to the latter Sort of Debt, what they es3 . See above, B. II. Chap. XI. Num. 5. 4. We have shewn above, Chap. II. of this Book, § 2. Note 1. that this is founded upon Reasons independent of this Consent of Nations, which is supposed, but not proved. II. (1) These Reasons would only prove, that so much Rigour ought not to be used with regard to the Subjects for the latter as the former Sort of Debt. For if there be any just War merely penal, as our Author acknowledges there...

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